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RESOLUTION OF MASS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
WITHIN THE FEDERAL RULES: A CASE FOR THE
INCREASED USE OF RULE 23(b)(3)
CLASS ACTIONS
Heather M. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
Mass product liability litigation is overwhelming the civil justice sys-
tem.1 Much of this litigation involves literally thousands of individuals
who have suffered injuries as a result of their exposure to pharmaceu-
tical products, medical devices, or toxic substances. Mass product lia-
bility litigation differs from ordinary litigation because it involves a
greater number of claimants, common issues and actors, and because
the value of each claim is interdependent.3 Recent mass product ia-
* I would like to thank Professor Benjamin Zipursky for his assistance in devel-
oping and writing this Note. I am also grateful to my husband and family for their
continued support and encouragement.
1. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal In-
jury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 Brook. L Rev. 961, 961 (1993); see also
Deborah R. Hensler et al., Trends in Tort Litigation: The Story Behind the Statistics
6-8 [hereinafter Trends in Tort Litigation] (illustrating that the number of products
liability suits filed in federal court has soared). In 1981, there were approximately
7500 cases pending against A.-. Robins, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield. ld. at 10.
By 1986, more than 325,000 claims had been filed in bankruptcy court. Id.
2. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 961. Although many types of claims may
fall under the general category of mass tort litigation, this Note specifically addresses
mass product liability claims, at times referred to as "mass exposure claims," which
involve claims against corporations for losses incurred as a result of an individual's
use of a product manufactured by that corporation. Moreover, this Note specifically
addresses claims that involve personal injury. Mass personal injury torts should be
distinguished from mass property damage torts. Mass torts involving property dam-
age often involve greater homogeneity among class members, greater commonality of
factual issues, and are more likely to be certified as class actions. See, e.g., Central
Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628,642-43 (D.S.C 1992) (certify-
ing a class of approximately 500 property owners with friable asbestos in their build-
ings regarding eight common issues), aff'd, 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1993); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L Rev. 1343,
1344 n.2 (1995).
3. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 966-67.
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bility claims include suits against the manufacturers of antihemophilic
factor ("AHF"),4 silicone breast implants 5 bendectin, 6 and asbestos. 7
The current prevalence of mass product liability litigation results
from several phenomena. Mass marketing of products increased the
general population's exposure to potentially injurious products at the
same time the mass media became more attuned to consumer and en-
vironmental safety issues. The medical community also developed a
greater capability to prove the nexus between an injury and exposure
to a particular product. In addition, legal rules and procedures devel-
oped that facilitated suits by plaintiffs seeking compensation from
product manufacturers.'
4. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995). For a full discussion of the Rhone-Poulenc litigation, see part II.
5. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1447
(N.D. Ala. 1995). In 1963, Dow Coming placed silicone breast implants on the mar-
ket that have allegedly developed leaks into women's bodies causing immune dis-
eases, neurological disorders, lupus, and connective tissue disorders. Hensler &
Peterson, supra note 1, at 992, 995. The FDA did not evaluate or approve of silicone
implants because it did not have the authority to regulate medical devices. William
Booth, Women Assail, Praise Silicone At Hearing, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1991, at Al,
A4. Although Congress passed legislation that eventually required the FDA to evalu-
ate the safety of the implants, the FDA permitted implants to stay on the market
while it determined their safety. Id.
6. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F.
Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd sub nom. 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1006 (1989). In 1956, the FDA approved Bendectin for treatment of morn-
ing sickness during pregnancy. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 978. Litigation
against the manufacturer of Bendectin began in 1977, asserting that ingestion of the
drug during pregnancy caused birth defects. See Mekdeci v. Merreli Nat'l Labs., 711
F.2d 1510, 1512 (11th Cir. 1983).
Although the FDA reevaluated the safety of the drug in 1979, it found that no
conclusive evidence existed that the drug caused birth defects. As a result, Merrell
Dow did not cease manufacturing the drug until it voluntarily did so nearly four years
later. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 978.
7. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L.
1991). Asbestos was used for many years as an insulation material. Evidence subse-
quently showed, however, that inhalation of asbestos could cause asbestosis, lung can-
cer, and mesothelioma. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1003 (footnote omitted).
For various discussions regarding other mass tort litigation, see In re Northern Dist.
Of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 848-50 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussing various aspects of the suits regarding the claim asserted against the manu-
facturers of the IUD which was linked to Pelvic Inflammatory Disease and fatal septic
abortions), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924,
924, 938 (Cal.) (holding that plaintiff could recover from manufacturer of diethylstil-
bestrol ("DES"), whose drug was linked to many types of cancer although plaintiff
could not prove which manufacturer had produced the drug), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); Paul D. Rheingold, The MER129 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass
Disaster Litigation, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 116, 116 (1968) (discussing the first mass tort litiga-
tion in which a plaintiffs' attorneys litigation group coordinated efforts against de-
fendant, Richardson-Merrell, Inc., in a product liability suit involving a cholesterol-
lowering drug that was linked to irreversible cataracts and skin and hair problems).
8. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1013.
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The civil justice system has fared poorly in resolving mass product
liability claims effectively. 9 Inordinate delays plague the system; cases
remain unresolved for decades.'" For example, the actions instituted
against the manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol ("DES") have been lin-
gering in the civil justice system for over thirteen years." In 1983, the
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire in
Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories declined to certify a potential class
consisting of women who were exposed to DES in utero who alleged
that this exposure caused cancer and other serious conditions. 12 In
1995, women are still litigating claims based on their exposure to DES
in Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co.'3
Similar delays have plagued the asbestos litigation. In 1973, the
Fifth Circuit held in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.14 that
asbestos manufacturers could be held strictly liable for injuries caused
from exposure to products containing asbestos.' 5 Presently, as many
as 100,000 asbestos claims remain pending.' 6 Thus, asbestos cases
continue to burden courts' dockets, with little hope of resolution in
the near future.' 7
Litigation involving tetracycline manufacturers also has lingered in
the courts.' 8 In Adams v. Lederle Laboratories," a case filed in 1983,
plaintiffs alleged that improper administration of tetracycline caused
discoloration and structural deterioration of their teethYz1 The case is
still pending in the Western District of Missouri.2 '
9. Deborah R Hensler et al., Asbestos in the Courts: The Challenge of Mass
Toxic Torts 24-29 (1985) [hereinafter Asbestos in the Courts].
10. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 963.
11. See Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.RD. 667, 670 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (declining
to certify a class composed of women exposed to DES); Mertens v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 99 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D.N.H. 1983) (declining to certify a class action consisting of
women exposed to DES).
12. Mertens, 99 F.R.D. at 39 (stating that these adverse effects include "cancerous
or pre-cancerous conditions, repeated pregnancy losses, infertility, incomplete, defec-
tive or abnormal development of their reproductive tracts and other[s]").
13. Kurczi, 160 F.R.D. at 667.
14. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
15. Id. at 1081. In Borel, the court considered an individual claim; it did not in-
volve a class action complaint. Id
16. Steven L. Schultz, In re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation:
Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposal for the Use of Federal Common Law in Mass
Tort Class Actions, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 553, 561 (1992).
17. For a comprehensive discussion of asbestos litigation from 1973 to the present,
see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1384-1404.
18. See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Adams v. Led-
erle Labs., 569 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1983). The District Court for the Western
District of Missouri refused to certify a class to resolve the claims against tetracycline
manufacturers. Tetracycline, 107 F.R.D. at 736.
19. 569 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
20. Id. at 237.
21. For an example of a development in the ongoing litigation, see In re Tetracy-
cline Cases, 927 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1991), in which the court reviewed the District
Court's decision to hold an attorney in contempt. Id. at 411-12.
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The present state of mass product liability litigation disadvantages
all parties litigating a claim. Long delays often mean that individual
plaintiffs do not survive to see the outcomes of their cases. 22 The re-
sults achieved through mass product liability litigation often appear to
be arbitrary; the compensation awarded often does not reflect the
harm the plaintiff has suffered or the culpability of the defendant.23
Costs of sustaining the litigation are unquestionably too high. Trans-
action costs often greatly exceed compensation awarded to victims. 24
As a result, some victims are denied access to the system and others
may not receive timely compensation. This result may significantly
reduce the deterrent effect of potential mass liability.25 In addition,
defendants may be susceptible to excessive punishment both from
multiple punitive damage awards and the high costs of defending
identical claims on a case-by-case basis.26
Congress has provided federal courts with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as a flexible device to facilitate the grouping.of claims or
issues to resolve litigation involving numerous plaintiffs with similar
22. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 963 (citing Asbestos in the Courts, supra
note 9, at 25-27; Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee On Asbestos Litigation,
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee (1991)).
23. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 963; see also In re School Asbestos Litig.,
789 F.2d 996, 1001 n.3 (3d Cir.) (stating that inconsistent verdicts look "more like
roulette than jurisprudence" (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986);
Federal Jury in New York Awards $31 Million in Consolidated Brooklyn Navy Yard
Lawsuits, [1990-1991] 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1107 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein's de-
scription of asbestos case verdicts as "a lottery").
24. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 963.
25. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public
Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 900-05 (1984) [hereinafter Pub-
lic Law Vision]. Some commentators have argued that in the mass tort context the
participants perceive compensation to be the primary objective. Coffee, supra note 2,
at 1355. John Coffee perceives deterrence as a problematic objective because most
products that give rise to mass tort litigation are removed from the market long
before the suit is ever brought. Id. Some critics argue that neither the goals of deter-
rence nor corrective justice are realizable in the mass tort context. See Robert L.
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation
Scheme, 52 Md. L. Rev. 951, 962 (1993) ("A system designed to achieve corrective
justice goals in two-party accidental harm cases simply cannot be accommodated ef-
fectively to the demands of mass tort cases [involving] ... long-latent toxic disor-
ders."); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious
Risk, 14 J. Leg. Stud. 779, 785 (1985) (stating that the deterrent value of penalties
depends heavily on their proximity to the act for which the penalties are assessed).
26. David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 Ind. L.J. 561, 564 (1987) ("Win or lose, the system's private law
[rocess exacts a punishing surcharge from defendant firms as well as plaintiffs.")
hereinafter Individual Justice]. Defendants' legal fees and expenses totaled between
4.7 and $5.7 billion dollars in nationwide tort litigation in 1985, out of a total $16 to
$19 billion spent for the various costs of the tort litigation system. Trends in Tort
Litigation, supra note 1, at 26-28. In the asbestos litigation, defendants' legal fees and
expenses constituted 37% of the per-claim expenditures, plaintiffs' net compensation
constituted 37%, and plaintiffs' legal fees and expenses constituted 26%. Id.
2332 [Vol. 64
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claims.2 7 Under Rule 23, a court may choose to certify a class to re-
solve either an entire controversy or specific issues.28 Rule 23 also
grants courts the authority to certify several types of class actions if a
claim or issue meets the Rule's requirements. 29 The few courts that
have certified classes in mass product liability litigation have typically
done so under Rule 23(b)(3).30 Consequently, this Note focuses on
this type of class action.3 '
The class action device grants courts numerous advantages in
resolving mass product liability litigation. By permitting the adjudica-
tion of many claims at once, the class action device reduces the burden
on the civil justice system to process individual claims. Rule 23 allows
plaintiffs to combine resources and litigate claims or issues together,
thereby providing access to the civil justice system for plaintiffs who
lack financial resources to bring individual claims. Faced with a
greater number of suits and potential liability, companies will have a
more effective incentive to develop and market their products safely.?2
By resolving many claims or issues at once, the class action device has
the potential to save plaintiffs and defendants the litigation costs that
result from individual adjudication. Rule 23 also benefits defendants
by binding class members if they win a class action suit.33 Moreover,
under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), courts have the flexibility to resolve common
issues together, yet allow parties to litigate unique issues or legal ques-
tions independently. 4 Consequently, parties who may have stronger
individual claims or defenses against their adversary may preserve
their advantage.
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
29. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Rule 23(b)(1) mandates certification of classes if
individual actions would prejudice the defendant or absent class members. Under
Rule 23(b)(2), a court must certify a class when the defendant has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class and injunctive relief is proper. A
court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action if it is superior to other methods avail-
able to adjudicate the controversy and if common questions predominate in the litiga-
tion over individual issues.
30. Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of
Class Actions, Consolidations, and Other Multiparty Devices 135 (1995). A federal
court has the discretion to certify this type of class action under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule
23(b)(3) class actions are distinguishable from Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions be-
cause only Rule 23(b)(3) class actions require notice to all class members of the exist-
ence of a class proceeding and permits class members to exclude themselves from the
binding effect of the judgment (the "opt out" provision). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3),
(c)(2).
31. See infra part II.A.
32. See infra part IV.D.
33. All class members may not be bound under Rule 23(b)(3) class action. See
infra part I.F.
34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.(c)(4)(A).
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The courts, however, have been reluctant to certify class actions in
the mass product liability context.3 1 These courts often rely upon
common preconceived notions regarding the drawbacks of class certi-
fication in mass product liability claims. These notions include
problems of determining applicable law, protection of litigants' inter-
est in individual justice, and fears of "blackmail settlements. '36 For
example, a typical failure to invoke a Rule 23(b)(3) class action oc-
curred in the recent mass exposure case In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc.37 In Rhone-Poulenc, the Seventh Circuit invoked many of these
concerns in refusing to uphold the District Court's certification of a
potential class of plaintiffs that had filed suit against manufacturers of
AHF, a blood product which had infected potential class members
with Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"). 38
This Note argues that courts should not hesitate to certify classes of
plaintiffs, at least with respect to common issues, in mass product lia-
bility suits under Rule 23(b)(3) type class actions. Mass exposure
cases involve a high degree of commonality of factual issues and legal
questions.39 In such cases, plaintiffs have suffered similar injuries re-
sulting from exposure to identical products; they face similar causa-
tion and liability issues.4 ° Thus, certification of class actions in mass
product liability litigation would allow courts to resolve many mass
exposure cases using the most efficient method provided by the cur-
rent Federal Rules.4'
Part I of this Note sets forth the requirements for class certification
under Rule 23(b)(3). This part then provides the factual background
and procedural history of In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,az a typical
product liability suit involving a claim against the manufacturers of
AIF that was once certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. Part II
35. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir.) (order-
ing decertification of the class in mass product liability context), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995).
36. See infra part II.
37. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
38. Id. at 1300-02. For other cases in which class certification was denied, see In re
Northern District of Calif., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982) (regarding IUDs), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Tetracycline
Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (regarding tetracycline); Caruso v. Celsius
Insulation Resources, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 530 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (regarding urea formalde-
hyde insulation); Sanders v. Tailored Chemical Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1543 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (same); Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983) (re-
garding DES); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D. 875 (D.S.D. 1982) (same);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979) (same); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65
F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (regarding asbestos); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63
A.D.2d 11, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1978) (regarding Dalkon Shield).
39. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 966.
40. Id. at 966-67.
41. For a discussion of why Rule 23 provides the most efficient method available
to litigate mass product liability claims, see part IV.F.
42. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
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addresses the procedural complications presented by certification of
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions in mass product liability litigation. Part UI
explains that objections to class certification in the mass product lia-
bility context do not present insurmountable obstacles to certification.
Finally, part IV discusses the advantages of employing Rule 23(b)(3)
in mass product liability litigation. This part then argues, in light of
the various advantages of class certification, that class treatment of
common issues was appropriate in Rhone-Poulenc. This Note con-
cludes that federal courts should employ Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
more freely in mass product liability litigation to fairly and efficiently
resolve common claims or issues.
I. RULE 23 AND THE LITIGATION OF A MAss PRODUCT
LIABILITY CLAIM
Rule 23 grants courts the authority to aggregate claims by means of
a "representative suit on behalf of groups of persons similarly situ-
ated."43 Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), a court may choose to certif a class
with respect to an entire controversy or only particular issues. To be
certified as a class action, a potential class must meet all of the re-
quirements of Rule 23(a), in addition to satisfying the criteria of one
of the three types of class actions maintainable as described in Rule
23(b).45 This part describes Rule 23 in general and discusses specifi-
cally the particular characteristics of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. This
part next examines In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,46 a case involving
a typical mass product liability claim. In Rhone-Poulenc, the district
court certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.47 The Seventh Circuit or-
dered the District Court to reverse the class certification, however,
following the course typically chosen by courts faced with class peti-
tions involving mass product liability claims.48
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
Rule 23(a) contains four requirements.49 The first requirement is
that the class must be "so numerous that joinder of all members is
43. Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, § 1.01, at 1-2 (3d
ed. 1992).
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A). This subsection provides that "When appropriate
... an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular
issues." Id.
45. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 3.01, at 3-5.
46. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R1D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994), revd
sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995).
47. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 423.
48. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1304.
49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23 provides for a class action if the following re-
quirements are met:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
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impracticable."5 The rationale underlying this first requirement is
that if joinder is possible, the class action device is not necessary to
achieve a unified resolution of the litigation.5' Second, Rule 23(a)(2)
requires that the case must present "questions of law or fact common
to the class."'52 This requirement ensures that the class action device
serves to advance convenient and uniform resolution of common is-
sues at once.53 Rules 23(a)(3) and 23(a)(4) mandate that the class
representative's claims or defenses be typical of the class and that the
representatives fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.54 Rule 23(a)(3)'s requirement seeks to ensure that the interests
of class representatives and members are sufficiently aligned so that
the court can rely on the self-interest of the class representatives to
drive them to pursue the interests of all class members.55 Rule
23(a)(4) is intended to ensure that the named plaintiffs do not have
any conflicts of interest with class members that would temper their
prosecution of other class members' interests. 56
In addition to complying with Rule 23(a), a potential class must fur-
ther satisfy the requirements of one of three subdivisions of Rule
23(b).57 Class actions are appropriate under Rules 23(b)(1) and
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
Id.
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
51. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 3.01, at 3-4.
52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
53. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 3.01, at 3-4.
54. Fed. R. Civ. P. (a)(3), (4).
55. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 3.01, at 3-4.
56. Id.
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) provides:(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interest; or(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only in-
dividual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
2336 [Vol. 64
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23(b)(2) if claims demand a single adjudication that binds all class
members. Rule 23(b)(1) mandates certification of classes if individual
actions would prejudice the defendant or absent class members.58
Under Rule 23(b)(2), a court must certify a class when the defendant
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class
and injunctive relief is proper.59
A court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action if it is superior to
other methods available to adjudicate the controversy and if common
questions predominate over individual issues in the litigation.' The
decision of whether to certify a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) rests
within the court's discretion. Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are distin-
guishable from Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions because only Rule
23(b)(3) class actions require notice to all class members of the exist-
ence of a class proceeding and permit class members to exclude them-
selves from the binding effect of the judgment (the "opt out"
provision) .61
As mentioned, to qualify as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, common
questions of law or fact must predominate over individual questions in
the litigation.62 Courts have generally held that the predominance re-
quirement is met if common issues constitute a significant part of the
individuals' claims.63 The second prong of Rule 23(b)(3) requires that
class action resolution be superior to other methods of adjudication
available. The Rule sets forth four factors that courts should consider
to determine whether the superiority requirement is met:
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
Id
58. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
60. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
61. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 4.01, at 4-6. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court held that all class members must be noti-
fied if they "can be identified through reasonable effort." let at 176.
62. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
63. See Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1992) ("In the con-
text of mass tort litigation, we have held that a class issue predominates if it consti-
tutes a significant part of the individual cases."); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d
468,472 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[i]n order to 'predominate,' common issues must
constitute a significant part of the individual cases"); In re School Asbestos Litig., 104
F.R.D. 422, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that when "common questions ... fare] a
significant aspect of the case" certification is allowed), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 789
F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); see also In re Tetracycline Cases,
107 F.R.D. 719,727 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that "the issues covered by the request
be such that their resolution (as a class matter) will materially advance a disposition
of the litigation as a whole").
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(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action. 64
The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that this list is not exhaustive
and that courts may consider other factors relevant to the litigation to
make their determination. 65 Consequently, ascertaining whether a
class action is the superior vehicle to process mass product liability
claims is often difficult because of the multiplicity of factors involved
in reaching such a decision.66 In addition, courts have specifically
struggled with one factor relevant to determining whether a potential
class meets the superiority requirement; whether a class action would
be manageable "has been the most hotly contested and the most fre-
quent ground for holding a class action is not superior." 67 Accord-
ingly, courts exercise a great deal of discretion in determining whether
a potential class meets the superiority requirement.
Rhone-Poulenc is one case in which the court wrestled with the is-
sue of whether a Rule 23(b)(3) class action was appropriate to resolve
the mass product liability claim before it. The complaint in Rhone-
Poulenc was filed in September 1993 against four manufacturers of
AHF on behalf of hemophiliacs (or their next of kin in cases in which
the hemophiliac had died) who were infected with HIV as a result of
their use of AIF.68 The next section traces the development of Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") and HIV in the hemo-
philiac community that gave rise to the class action petition sought in
Rhone-Poulenc. It then explores the procedural history of Rhone-
Poulenc, including a detailed examination of the District Court's certi-
fication order and the Circuit Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing the District Court to reverse the class certification.
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
65. Rules Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.
69, 104 (1966).
66. For example, one of these factors is found in the Uniform Class Actions Act
which compels a court to consider whether a class action is the most efficient or prac-
tical method to resolve claims or issues. Uniform Class Actions Act § 3(a) (National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, final draft adopted Aug. 5,
1976), in Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 4.27, at 4-109. Courts also have consid-
ered the interests of members in individually controlling their suits, especially in suits
that involve personal injuries because they seem to require individual trial tactics to
attain appropriate damage awards. See In re Northern District of Cal. Dalkon Shield
IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983).
67. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 4.32, at 4-125.
68. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 414 (N.D. Ill. 1994),
rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
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B. Creation of the Basis of a Mass Product Liability Claim
Hemophilia is a hereditary bleeding disorder that affects approxi-
mately 20,000 persons in the United States.69 This disease results
from a deficiency of proteins in the blood, commonly known as Factor
VIII and Factor IX, that are necessary for coagulation. 0 The disease
causes excessive bleeding, which may be the result of trauma or may
be spontaneous.7'
Before the late 1970s and early 1980s, common treatment for
hemophiliacs included transfusions of plasma or whole blood.72 These
treatments required hospitalization and were not extremely effective,
because the plasma and whole blood did not contain high levels of
Factor VIII and IX.73 In the late 1960s, however, scientists developed
a process that enabled them to extract Factor VIII and Factor IX from
donors' blood, concentrate it, and infuse the hemophiliac with the
concentrate, known as AHF.74 AHF was more effective than whole
blood transfusions in preventing and stopping episodes of bleeding
and did not require hospitalization because the patient could receive
infusions at home.75 The new product, however, "was concentrated
from blood factors drawn from hundreds or thousands of people, mul-
tiplying the risk of getting tainted blood." 76
In 1981, scientists identified AIDS in the general population. The
diagnosis in hemophiliacs did not take place until 1982.1 By 1984, the
medical community agreed that HIV transmission occurred via semen
and blood.7" That same year, the medical community discovered that
the virus could be killed by heating the blood supply.79 Then, in 1985,
scientists discovered a reliable test for the presence of HIV. ° All
blood donated for the manufacture of AHF has undergone testing for
the presence of HIV since 1985.1 Supplies that test negative are still
heat-treated because the tests for HIV are not infallible. s
69. Id. at 413. For a discussion of hemophilia generally, see Leon W. Hoyer. He-
mophilia A, 330 New Eng. J. Med. 38 (1994).
70. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 413.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 413-14.
74. Donna Shaw, On the Trail of Tainted Blood, The Phila. Inquirer, Apr. 16, 1995,
at E2.
75. Id.
76. Michael Unger, Tainted Blood, Hemophiliacs Sue Drug Companies Over HIV
Infection, Newsday, Oct. 2, 1993, at 7.
77. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. ld.; Unger, supra note 76, at 7.
82. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995).
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HIV and AIDS have had a widespread and devastating effect upon
the hemophiliac population.83 More than half of all hemophiliacs
were infected with HIV by 1985. More than eighty percent of
hemophiliacs with severe hemophilia contracted HIV by that same
year.85 Attorneys representing the HIV-infected hemophiliacs in
Rhone-Poulenc have presented evidence that 2000 hemophiliacs have
died of AIDS and nearly half or more of the remaining hemophiliac
population may be HIV-positive.86
AIDS has decreased the life span of people with hemophilia by
thirty percent.' As a result, the life expectancy for hemophiliacs has
fallen to the same level that existed before modern treatment was
available.8 8 The median age of death for hemophiliacs fell dramati-
cally-from fifty-seven years in 1979-81 to forty years in 1987-90.89
An author of a new study of hemophilia stated: "Sadly, we've taken a
giant step backwards." 90 Death rates for persons with hemophilia
have tripled.91 In 1979, 400,000 individuals in the United States suffer-
ing from hemophilia died.92 In 1989, the death rate for hemophiliacs
in the United States was 1.3 million.93
Spokespeople for the pharmaceutical companies claim that the
companies "did everything possible to provide a safe product. '94 As
more information became available regarding the development of
HIV in AHF, however, questions began to arise regarding whether
AHF, which initially was hailed as a miracle for hemophiliacs, should
not have ever been put on the market because of its potential dan-
gers.9 5 Investigations into what the defendants actually knew about
the dangers of AHF and what measures they could have taken to
83. David Gates et al., An American Tragedy in Iowa, Newsweek, Feb. 7, 1994, at
44 ("Since Vince and Mary Goedken celebrated their golden wedding anniversary in
1986, seven family members have died of AIDS; an eighth is HIV-positive. They are
victims of America's 'hemophilia holocaust': the spread of AIDS among hemophiliacs
who received contaminated blood products.").
84. U.S. CDC: HIV Cutting Lives Short in Hemophilia, Study Says, AIDS Wkly.,
Feb. 14, 1994 [hereinafter Study].
85. Id.
86. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 129; Bryan D. Garruto & Frances A. Tomes, In the
Dark Shadow of AIDS: How Safe Is The Blood Supply, N.J. Law., Apr. 26, 1993, at 19
("In January 1990, the CDC estimated that 10,000 hemophiliacs ... had been infected
with AIDS and HIV.").
87. Study, supra note 84.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting author Dr. Terence Chorba).
91. Study, supra note 84.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Unger, supra note 76, at 7 (" 'The company and the industry did
everything possible to provide a safe product,' said Edward Colton, vice president and
general counsel for Alpha Therapeutic, one of the companies.")
95. See Elizabeth Kastor, Blood Feud: Hemophiliacs & AIDS, Wash. Post, May 10,
1993, at B1. At first, Dick Valdez's only thought was of saving his sons when he
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make their product safer revealed disturbing implications. According
to one HIV-infected hemophiliac, "the companies who sold tainted
blood products are guilty of 'mass murder.' "9
The first link between blood, plasma infusions, and blood-borne vi-
ruses was discovered during World War II.9 In 1945, Captain Eman-
uel M. Rappaport of the United States Army Medical Corps
published an article in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion concluding that transfusions could transmit hepatitis and that
"'pooling of plasma probably increases considerably the incidence of
jaundice among the recipients.' "98 One year later, Rappaport pro-
posed the screening of donors and urged research into ways to kill
blood-borne viruses.99 In 1950, University of Chicago researchers
published a study demonstrating how heat could kill blood-borne vi-
ruses in whole blood. 100
Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, heat-treatment tech-
niques to inactivate viruses in blood remained unperfected. During
this course of time, non-heat-treated AHF received approval from the
Food and Drug Administration. Because manufacturers of AHF did
not possess the technology to deactivate viruses in their product, Stan-
ford University Professor Judith Pool and the World Federation of
Hemophilia repeatedly urged the government to prevent the use of
paid donors in the manufacture of AHF because they created an in-
creased presence of hepatitis and other blood-borne viruses in the
product.' 0' In 1977, the World Health Organization also suggested to
manufacturers that they should kill viruses in their products. By 1978,
a German drugmaker actually killed viruses in AHF by heating the
product.102
The manufacturers of AHF chose not to employ the German heat-
treatment technique, mainly because the process reduced the yield of
clotting factor. Given the product's great benefits, the government,
manufacturers, and some doctors merely accepted the almost certain
risk that most hemophiliacs would contract the potentially deadly hep-
treated his hemophiliac sons with Factor VI. Id. Now his sons are in their twenties
and they are HIV-positive. Id
96. Barbara Yost, Lethal Medicine Hemophiliacs Dying of AIDS Were Infected by
Contaminated Drugs. Is the Blood Industry Guilty of this 'Mass Murder?, Phoenix
Gazette, Oct. 17, 1993, at G1 ("Somebody sold us out for a dollar.").
97. Shaw, supra note 74, at El.
98. Id Considering AHF was produced by pooling tens of thousands of donors,
the risk of individuals using the product contracting the virus was near certain. Id. at
E2. While "[l]arge pools are highly profitable ... they are medically bankrupt." Id.
99. Id at El.
100. d The technique unfortunately also killed the clotting proteins in the blood.
Id.
101. Pool and colleagues developed cryoprecipitate, a plasma paste made from sev-
eral donors, that "revolutionized hemophilia treatment." Shaw, supra note 74, at El.
102. Id.
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atitis disease. 10 3 As a result, in 1982, when the first hemophiliac was
diagnosed with AIDS, no heat-treated ABF was available in the
United States although a safer product was available in Germany.1 °4
Only in 1983, after a majority of the hemophiliac population was
infected with HIV and after certain manufacturers began to forecast a
loss of business if the competitors provided a heat-treated product
faster, 105 did the companies in the United States begin to develop a
safer product. A recent report by the National Institute of Medicine
concluded that: "In the Committee's judgment, heat-treatment
processes to prevent the transmission of hepatitis could have been de-
veloped before 1980, an advance that would have prevented many
cases of AIDS in individuals with hemophilia."'1 6 As a result, the
tragic injuries suffered by the hemophiliac population laid the founda-
tion for a new mass product liability claim.
C. Judicial Management of a Mass Product Liability Claim
Nearly 400 plaintiffs have filed almost 300 lawsuits against the man-
ufacturers of ABF in state and federal courts. 10 7 The panel on mul-
tidistrict litigation consolidated all of the federal cases for pretrial
discovery in the Northern District of Illinois.108
103. Id. at E2.
104. Id.
105. See id. Alpha Therapeutics waited until their marketing department, whose
job was to keep up with competitors, gave their research and development a directive
to begin research on heat-treatment. Id.
106. Institute of Medicine, HIV and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Crisis Deci-
sionmaking, Nat'l Academy Press, Wash., D.C. 1995, at 4-13.
107. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995); Shaw, supra note 74, at E2-E3. Sixty percent of the suits were filed
in state courts and the remaining forty percent in federal courts. Rhone-Poulenc, 51
F.3d at 1296.
108. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, when civil actions involving one or more common and
often complex questions of fact are pending in several federal district courts, the ac-
tions may be transferred to one district for coordinated and pretrial proceedings
under a single judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings ... [if] such proceeding
will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceed-
ings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
previously terminated....
(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be con-
ducted by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judi-
cial panel on multidistrict litigation.
Id. Although consolidation of pretrial proceedings permits efficient judicial resolu-
tion of discovery and other preliminary matters, individual claims are remanded for
trial to their original district. Plaintiffs are denied the opportunity to try their cases
together with other similarly situated plaintiffs. Thus, they are forced to pay the ex-
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Rhone-Poulenc was one of the 300 suits spawned by the AHF con-
troversy involving a class action complaint filed in September 1993.'1
The complaint alleged that class members' infections resulted from
the negligence of the defendant manufacturers.' 10 The complaint also
included a count that charged the National Hemophilia Foundation
with negligence and a breach of fiduciary duty."'
The plaintiffs offered two theories of liability. The first theory con-
tended that before the pharmaceutical companies became aware of
the presence of AIDS or HIV in the blood supply, they were aware of
the presence of hepatitis, another lethal disease in the blood prod-
uct."' Thus, the defendants did not proceed with due care because
they failed to take steps to eliminate the presence of hepatitis in their
product." 3 Had the defendants taken effective measures to kill hepa-
titis, the defendants would have unknowingly also killed HIV." 4 The
plaintiffs argued that the defendants could have heat-treated the
blood, screened blood donors, or refused to deal with certain donors
known to be at high risk of infection with hepatitis." 5
The plaintiffs' second theory of liability asserted that the defendants
"dragged their heels in screening donors and taking other measures to
prevent contamination of [AHF]" once they became aware of the
presence of HIV in the early 1980s.1 6 Heat-treating techniques to kill
hepatitis were available by the 1940s; the defendants, however, did not
perfect and utilize the techniques to inactivate viruses in AHF until
1983.117
Judge Grady of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois partially certified the plaintiff class in Rhone-
Poulenc under the authority of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 8 with respect to
penses of prosecuting their claim during trial instead of being able to share these costs
with other plaintiffs.
109. Rhone Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296. The four pharmaceutical companies named as
defendants are Armour Pharmaceutical Company, Inc., Miles. Inc., Baxter Health-
care Corporation, and Alpha Therapeutic Corporation.
110. Id.
111. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 414 (N.D. Ill. 1994),
rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293. (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
112. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1301.
115. Id. at 1296. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants collected plasma from
paid donors, a group they should have known included many persons, such as intrave-
nous drug users, at high risk for viral infection. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Shaw, supra note 74, at El (stating that the "key issue ... is why heat-
treating techniques that killed hepatitis-techniques first used by Army-financed
scientists back in the 1940s-were not perfected until 1983 for blood-clotting products
used by hemophiliacs").
118. Fed. R Civ. P. 23(c)(4). This section provides in pertinent part:
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
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two issues: (1) the manufacturers' negligence, and (2) the National
Hemophilia Foundation's breach of fiduciary duty.119 Judge Grady
reasoned that certification of a class action to determine these two
issues was both feasible and useful because it offered the advantage of
avoiding repetitive litigation.120 He held that "fact questions as to
what was known in the relevant scientific community at various times,
and the efficacy of what the [manufacturers] were doing at various
times, are common [to members of the class]."' 1 Once a jury deter-
mined what the manufacturers knew at relevant times, it could deter-
mine the defendants' duty and whether each of the defendant
companies breached that duty.
Judge Grady also recognized that "it is unlikely in the extreme that
every member of the proposed class in this case would be able to fund
a separate action of that kind, even with attorneys working on a con-
tingent fee basis. Expert witness fees alone would run into the tens of
thousands of dollars."'" In addition, he noted that although varying
state substantive laws would apply, "the definition of ordinary negli-
gence is substantially identical in all jurisdictions."' 23 Accordingly, a
jury could determine whether the defendants breached their duty of
reasonable care based on one generalized negligence standard. 24
Judge Grady refused to certify a class to resolve the entire contro-
versy because each plaintiff carried the burden of establishing which
company's negligence was a proximate cause of his HIV infection.125
Because the proximate cause issue would be unmanageable on a class-
wide basis, Judge Grady found that certification of the entire contro-
versy did not meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).126
The defendants subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to reverse the class certi-
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
Id.
119. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1994),
rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). The class consisted of plaintiffs that were involved in the mul-
tidistrict litigation that was currently before the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois.
120. Id. at 415-16.
121. Id. at 421.
122. Id. at 415.
123. Id. at 419.
124. See Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 419 (N.D. I11.
1994), rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied. 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
125. Id. at 422-23.
126. Id.
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fication order."2 7 A majority of the panel granted the writ and subse-
quently ordered decertification of the class."2
Judge Posner, writing for the majority in a 2-1 decision, reasoned
that several concerns precluded certification of the class. He stated
that class certification would subject defendants to intolerable settle-
ment pressure. 2 9 He reasoned that class certification may facilitate
prosecution of more claims than would otherwise be brought and
pressure defendants to settle notwithstanding the possibility that the
plaintiffs' claims lacked legal merit. As an indication of the possibility
that the plaintiffs' claim was meritless, he considered their record of
losing twelve of thirteen cases previously tried. 3 Judge Posner also
expressed concern about the unfairness of forcing the defendants "to
stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial." 131 He
was concerned with one jury "hold[ing] the fate of an industry in the
palm of its hand"'3 because that jury might disagree with the previ-
ous thirteen juries and "hurl the industry into bankruptcy."' 33
Judge Posner also found that the potential class would become un-
manageable because the district court could not apply a single sub-
stantive law but would have to instruct the jury in accordance with
conflicting state negligence laws.134 He reasoned that if the district
court applied one general negligence standard,13 5 it would be creating
a federal common law, a development prohibited by the Supreme
Court in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.136
127. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995).
A writ of mandamus is an instrument by which a superior court may compel a lower
court to take a certain action. Writs of mandamus have traditionally been issued in
response to abuses of judicial power. The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, and
thus, usually invoked in extraordinary circumstances. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S 379, 382-85 (1953); see also Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319
U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (stating that the writ has been used in federal courts only "to con-
fine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it
to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so").
128. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1304.
129. Id. at 1298.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1299.
132. Id. at 1300.
133. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 304 U.S. 64,78-80 (1938). Judge Posner also reasoned that Judge Grady's cer-
tification order would subject the first jury's finding to reevaluation by other juries,
when successive juries determined issues such as comparative negligence and proxi-
mate cause. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). Thus, he argued that defendants would be deprived of
their Seventh Amendment rights. Id. According to one commentator, "This Seventh
Amendment objection seems a weak argument, as a series of circuit court decisions
have approved the use of successive juries to determine different questions, and Rule
23(c)(4)(A) explicitly contemplates use of such a procedure." Coffee, supra note 2, at
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Judge Posner concluded that although the class action device may
be appropriate to resolve certain mass product liability claims, exem-
plified by the asbestos litigation, the AHF litigation did not warrant
invocation of Rule 23.13' He determined that the AHF litigation sim-
ply did not create sufficient pressure on the federal court system. 138
Following the Seventh Circuit decision, the plaintiffs petitioned for
a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court seeking a re-
versal of Judge Posner's issuance of a writ of mandamus to decertify
the class. On October 5, 1995, the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
effectively permitting Judge Posner's decision to stand. 139
As a result of the decertification of the class in Rhone-Poulenc, the
case will remain consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the Seventh
Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Each individual case, however, will
return to its transferor court for individual trial.1 40 Thus, Rhone-
Poulenc may take its place among the numerous mass product liability
claims in which courts have denied requests for class certification.14 1
D. Rhone-Poulenc Follows History of Failures To Certify
Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) authorized the court in Rhone-Poulenc
to certify a class action for the resolution of common issues. Judge
Posner declined to permit the district court to use a tool provided to
the courts to manage exactly this type of complex litigation. The
Rhone-Poulenc case is far from anomalous. Many judges faced with
mass product liability actions have similarly failed to take advantage
of the Rule 23(b)(3) mechanism. The next part explores the ostensi-
ble reasons behind the courts' reluctance to exploit this tool in other
mass exposure cases.
1440 (citing Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 693 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)). In Arthur Young, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the right to a unitary trial is not absolute and only applies if the issues proposed
to be bifurcated are "'so interwoven ... that the [one] cannot be submitted to the
jury independently of the [other] without confusion and uncertainty which would
amount to a denial of a fair trial.' " Arthur Young, 549 F.2d at 693 (quoting United
Airlines, Inc. v. Weiner, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961)).
137. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1304.
138. See id.
139. Grady v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
141. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. Of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), (regarding IUDs), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In
re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (regarding tetracycline);
Caruso v. Celsius Insulation Resources, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 530 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (regard-
ing urea formaldehyde); Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983) (re-
garding DES); Sanders v. Tailored Chem. Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(regarding urea formaldehyde insulation); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D.
875 (D.S.D. 1982) (regarding DES); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C.
1979) (same); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (regarding asbes-
tos); Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 1978) (regarding
Dalkon Shield).
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II. COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING RuLE 23(b)(3) CLASS
ACTIONS IN THE MASS PRODUCT LIABILITY CONTEXT
Courts have generally been reluctant to certify class actions in the
mass product liability context under Rule 23(b)(3). 14 2 In refusing to
certify class actions, these courts have invoked various practical and
policy concerns regarding this aggregative technique. This part dis-
cusses these concerns.
A. The 1966 Amendment to Rule 23
Some courts trace their reluctance to apply Rule 23 to mass expo-
sure cases to the Advisory Committee Notes (the "Notes") that ac-
companied the 1966 amendment to Rule 23.113 The Notes stated: "A
'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that signifi-
cant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of
liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different
ways. ,144
The Notes embraced the view that certification of class actions for
mass tort litigation was not feasible because inevitably individual
questions would require separate trials.1 45 Many courts have adopted
this rationale and accordingly invoked the Notes as their justification
for refusing to certify class actions.1'4 For instance, in In re Northern
District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion,147 the court decertified a class that had been conditionally certi-
fied by the district court. a4 In explaining its decision, the Ninth
Circuit relied partially upon the Notes' 49 The court agreed with the
Notes that "[i]n products liability actions . . . individual issues may
outnumber common issues."'150 The Notes thus offer one explanation
for courts' hesitancy to certify class actions in mass exposure cases.
B. The Theory of Individual Justice
The most traditional objection to utilizing class actions to resolve
mass product liability claims is that the device violates the notion that
142. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.02, at 17-6.
143. Schultz, supra note 16, at 556 n.13.
144. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee's note (1966 amendment).
145. Id.
146. See Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 397, 399 (B.D. Va.
1975) (denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification of airplane cases, taking the
Notes into consideration); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R D. 566, 569, 572 (F.D. Tex.
1974) (denying class certification in asbestos litigation, taking the Notes into
consideration).
147. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
148. Id. at 856-57.
149. Id. at 852-853.
150. Id. at 853.
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individuals should be free to pursue their own litigation.151 Courts
have been generally hesitant to certify mass product liability claims
that involve severe personal injury or death.152 The rationale underly-
ing this policy is the belief that in serious cases involving very personal
issues, plaintiffs should have control over their own litigation. 153 Tra-
ditionally, courts have disfavored class actions because of a perception
that such actions sacrifice individuals' control over their suits by forc-
ing them to participate in a large mass product liability class.154 In
Yandle v. PPG Industries,' which involved a suit brought by former
asbestos plant employees, the court noted the "general feeling that
when personal injuries are involved... each person should have the
right to prosecute his own claim and be represented by the lawyer of
his choice."' 56
Proponents of individual justice also argue that certification of class
actions may disadvantage some plaintiffs because conveying individ-
ual damages to a jury may be difficult and yield uncertain results when
a joint class action trial with a bifurcated damages procedure is in-
volved.' 57 Moreover, plaintiffs may be unable to obtain the quick set-
tlements that might be available in individual suits' 5 8 because Rule
23(e) requires court approval of class-wide voluntary dismissals or
settlements.1 59
An additional consideration that has led courts to disfavor class cer-
tification is that the judiciary possesses other tools to manage mass
tort litigation that courts have perceived as comporting better with
traditional notions of individual justice.' 60 For instance, courts can ap-
point special masters to promote efficient resolution of cases. 6'
Courts may also consolidate cases under Rule 42(a) of the Federal
151. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.02, at 17-7 to 17-8.
152. Id. at 17-7.
153. See id.; see also Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D.
Va. 1975) (acknowledging plaintiffs' strong interests in controlling their own causes of
actions in mass accident cases); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (explaining that in usual class action suits "individual claims are usually
somewhat peripheral to the lives of the claimants").
154. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 595-96; Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass
Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 71.
155. 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
156. Id. at 569; see also Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (denying class certification because air crash cases are different from "the
usual class action, where individual claims are usually somewhat peripheral to the
lives of the claimants").
157. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.02, at 17-9.
158. Id.
159. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
160. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.02, at 17-6.
161. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judici-
ary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394, 395-98 (1986). A court may
appoint a special master to act as the representative of the court in litigation, usually
to hear and determine pretrial matters. A federal judge has the authority to appoint a
special master under 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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Rules of Civil Procedure' 62 or encourage litigants to use the test case
approach.163
Courts view personal injury claims, because of their personal nature
and severity, as especially deserving of individual treatment. As a re-
sult, courts often do not certify class actions in mass product liability
cases out of respect for the notion of individual justice.
C. The Determination of Applicable Law
The Supreme Court, in Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins,1" prohibited a
federal court sitting in diversity from applying a federal common law
in lieu of the state substantive law that would apply if the case were
being tried in state court."6 As a result, a federal court sitting in di-
versity must behave exactly as a state court would; it must apply the
substantive law indicated by the choice of law of the state in which it
sits.166 Moreover, in Van Dusen v. Barrack,67 the Supreme Court
held that if a defendant seeks to transfer an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to another venue, the transferee federal court should apply
the substantive law of the state in which the transferor court sits, in-
cluding that state's choice of law rules."6 As a result, in the mass
162. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Rule 42 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or
all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consoli-
dated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
IL A court may order several actions to be united if all actions are between the same
parties, pending in the same court, and involve substantially the same subject-matter,
issues, and defenses.
163. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.02, at 17-6. Under the test case ap-
proach, one lawsuit is brought to establish a legal principle or right that would bind
others involved in similar cases. The test case is selected out of a number of suits
brought by several plaintiffs against similarly situated defendants that involve the
same questions and evidence. The case then goes first to trial and its decision serves
as a test of the other plaintiffs' right to recover.
164. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
165. d. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. ... There is no
federal general common law."). The Erie doctrine applies to nationwide class actions.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
,166. The federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law of the state
in which it sits. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612,628 (1964); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). A state must recognize the sovereignty of
the laws of its sister states. Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 1(1), § 42 cmt. a (1934).
For a discussion of the problem of determining applicable law in mass tort litigation,
see Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort Litigation and The Dilemma of Federalization, 44
DePaul L. Rev. 755, 788 (1995) ("In short, in the absence of a federalized choice-of-
law scheme for mass tort litigation (or federal substantive mass tort standards), fed-
eral judges must determine on a case-by-case basis the applicable state substantive
law in each new mass tort litigation.").
167. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
168. IL at 627-30.
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product liability context a single law almost never controls a mass
product liability claim169 because the consolidated suits arose in vari-
ous fora throughout the nation; thus numerous state substantive laws
and choice of law rules typically apply.170
The Supreme Court recently confronted the choice of law problem
present in many class actions in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.171 In
Shutts, the Court held that a Kansas state court could not apply Kan-
sas law to all plaintiffs involved in a class action brought against a gas
company by its investors to recover interest on royalties suspended
pending final administrative approval of gas price increases. 172 After
an inquiry to determine whether Kansas law materially conflicted with
any other applicable law, the Court found that differences among the
applicable laws of Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana could substantially
affect the defendants' liability.'73 Thus, the Court held that Kansas
could not apply its law to all parties because it "may not abrogate the
rights of parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything
done or to be done within them."' 74 In reaching its decision, the
Court substantially relied upon Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,175 in
which the court had held that a state must have a significant contact or
an aggregation of contacts to apply its own substantive law in a consti-
tutionally permissible manner to prevent such a choice of law from
being arbitrary or unfair. 176 Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently
prohibited courts from artificially simplifying the law applicable to a
complex action; the requirement that courts apply a multiplicity of
choice of law provisions, as well as substantive laws, can strip away
some of the advantages of a class action.' 77
In Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner concluded that certification of a
class action, as Judge Grady envisioned it, would violate the Erie doc-
trine.' 7a1 He reasoned that Judge Grady's decision to apply a single
negligence standard to the manufacturers of AHF would in effect cre-
ate a general federal common law of negligence-a development pro-
169. See Mullenix, supra note 166, at 785. While this rule holds true for mass prod-
uct liability cases, cases involving mass accident claims usually will be decided accord-
ing to the law of the state in which the accident occurred.
170. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 755 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (wrestling with the search for a single standard in a mass tort case), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
171. 472 U.S. 797 (1995).
172. Id. at 818, 822-23.
173. Id. at 816-18.
174. Id. at 822.
175. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
176. Id. at 312-13.
177. Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale L.J. 1, 13-14 (1986).
178. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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hibited by Erie.179 In In re School Asbestos Litigation,tm the Third
Circuit expressed similar fears regarding a class certified to resolve
claims against asbestos manufacturers.' 8' The Third Circuit noted
that "the dictates of state law may not be buried under the vast ex-
panse of a federal class action. The parties' rights under state substan-
tive law must be respected, and if that is not possible in a class action,
then that procedure may not be used." 182
In mass product liability actions that involve the laws of various
states, the Erie doctrine creates a significant obstacle to employing a
uniform negligence law. Fearing that a class action would become un-
manageable183 if it required the application of different state substan-
tive laws, courts disfavor class certification in the mass product
liability context.
D. The Creation of Intolerable Financial Risks and Settlement
Pressure on Defendants
Class actions create a greater risk that defendants will be subject to
mass liability than if individual suits are brought against them. Courts
have acknowledged the increased pressure to settle that is placed
upon defendants faced with enormous potential liability due to class
certification.1ls Courts that have refused to certify classes for mass
179. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995). Judge Grady argued that a jury could determine whether the de-
fendants took due care under one general standard because no substantial variations
distinguished the tort rules of different states. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
157 F.R.D. 410, 419 (N.D. M11. 994), rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. C. 184 (1995); see also In re Diamond
Shamrock Chemical Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir.) (stating that a jury hearing the
Agent Orange litigation may be asked whether the defendants took due care because
the different tort rules of different states would not substantially differ), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1067 (1984). Judge Grady further asserted that the defendants have not
pointed to any substantial difference between the negligence laws of the 50 states
except the distinction made by several states between ordinary negligence or the pro-
fessional standard of care. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 419. Judge Grady expressed that
those differences could be minimized by means of a jury instruction. Id.
Judge Posner argued, however, that the law of negligence may differ significantly
between states. For instance, the "serendipity" theory appears to dispense with the
foreseeability factor because the victims of HIV infection were not foreseeable.
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1301. In states that incorporate foreseeability of the risk
into the test for negligence, the "serendipity theory" would fail. Id. In states that do
not incorporate the foreseeability factor, the "serendipity theory" may succeed. Id.
As a result, if a federal court applied one negligence standard it would be ignoring
state substantive law and instead be promoting a federal common law in its place
which clearly violates Erie.
180. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
181. Id. at 1007.
182. Id.
183. The manageability of a class action is relevant to the determination of whether
the class action vehicle is a superior method to resolve a suit.
184. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. C. 184 (1995).
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product liability claims are often fearful of forcing defendants to ac-
cept "blackmail settlements" in the face of exposure to mass liability
although the plaintiffs' claim may lack legal merit. 185 The court in In
re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability
Litigation'86 considered whether to uphold a settlement class in a mul-
tidistrict product liability action charging General Motors with manu-
facturing defective fuel tanks that exploded during low impact car
accidents.' 87 In General Motors, the Third Circuit deplored the poten-
tial of class actions as creating "the opportunity for a kind of legalized
blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might use the threat of
a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a
settlement far in excess of the individual claims' actual worth."'188
In Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner reasoned that certification of the
potential class would subject the defendants to intolerable settlement
pressure.18 9 He indicated that this pressure was especially inappropri-
ate in light of the defendants' record of winning twelve of the first
thirteen cases litigated. 190 Judge Posner seemed to have taken the
plaintiffs' losing record to indicate that the defendants were likely to
win most of the remaining individual cases.' 91 He estimated that if the
suits were resolved individually, the defendants would probably have
to pay damages in roughly twenty-five of the 300 individual remaining
cases, with potential liability capped at $125 million.19 He explained
that if the plaintiff class was certified, the defendants could potentially
face a significantly greater number of plaintiffs who would seek to
capitalize on the opportunity provided by one jury verdict that might
find the defendants liable.' 93 Judge Posner feared that the magnitude
of this potential liability might cause the defendants to eliminate this
risk by electing to settle the cases although claims asserted against
185. Id.; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. J. 1073, 1075 (1984)(stating that settlement is a problematic technique because: "Consent is often co-
erced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial
and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done.").
186. 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
187. Id. at 777-79.
188. Id at 784-85. In General Motors, the court refused to certify a settlement class
action because "the settlement [was] not fair and adequate; more precisely... the
district court erred in accepting plaintiffs' unreasonably high estimate of the settle-
ment's worth, in over-estimating the risk of maintaining class status and of establish-
ing liability and damages, and in misinterpreting the reaction of the class." Id. at 779.
189. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995). For a discussion regarding incentives to settle that are present in
mass tort litigation, see Kenneth R. Feinberg, Claims Resolution Facilities and the
Mass Settlement of Mass Torts, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1990, at 79, 80-84.
190. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
191. Id.
192. Id. His estimate was based on the plaintiffs' record in previous trials.
193. Id.
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them may lack merit.'94 He viewed a settlement reached under these
circumstances as suspect.' 95
In Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner also expressed concern that class
certification might force defendants into bankruptcy."9 Judge Posner
did not wish to certify a class if doing so would force "defendants to
stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial."' 97
Thus, some courts hesitate to certify class actions because they wish
to protect defendants from extortionate settlements accepted merely
to avoid the risk of mass liability and the expenses of defending nu-
merous claims that lack legal merit. Moreover, some courts seek to
protect defendant companies from the financial ruin inherent in mass
liability. As a result, these courts may deny class certification in the
mass product liability context.
E. The Temptation to Unethical Behavior
An additional reason cited by courts for declining to certify class
actions is the belief that class certification encourages unethical be-
havior by attorneys involved in the litigation. 198 The nature of the
class action device may create several different types of incentives for
corrupt behavior.
Class action suits are believed to encourage claim solicitation.199 In
Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines,2 " the court stated, "At first blush, the
use of the class action device in personal injury litigation seems to
contain at least the suggestion of improper claim solicitation."1''
194. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995).
195. Id. (citing Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120
(1973)). For discussions of class certification and the pressure on defendants to settle,
see Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence:
Tort System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 1755, 1780-82 (1994); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private
Rights of Action under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 963, 973 n.38 (1994); Milton Handler, The Shift From Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Re-
view, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1971); Charles D. Schoor, Class Actions: The Right to
Solicit, 16 Santa Clara L. Rev. 215, 239-40 & n.82 (1976); Note, Conflicts in Class
Actions and Protection of Absent Class Members, 91 Yale L.J. 590, 605 n.67 (1982).
196. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 184 (1995).
197. Id.
198. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.02, at 17-8.
199. Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566, 569 (E.D. Tex. 1974). The Yandle court
cited this concern as an additional factor that militated against certifying a class action
to resolve claims against manufacturers of asbestos. Id.
200. 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
201. Id. at 78.
2353
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Even courts that have certified class actions have noted their aware-
ness of the potential for this abuse.2"2
Another danger of class certification is that attorneys representing
plaintiffs pursuant to contingent fee arrangements may include a large
number of claims, even if some claims are weak, in the hopes of reach-
ing a package settlement.2 °3 Moreover, class actions present the op-
portunity for plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys to strike a
"sweetheart" settlement, in which the attorneys for the plaintiff class
settle the claim prematurely to ensure that they recover their fees,
although the plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of prevailing at trial or
attaining a more beneficial settlement.2°4
In addition, the nature of mass tort litigation has created two types
of plaintiffs' firms that specialize in this type of suit. Both types of
firms have been subject to criticism by commentators for improperly
handling mass exposure cases.20 5 The first type consists of "boutique
firms" that screen clients and only bring actions on behalf of those
severely injured plaintiffs who may seek high damages.20 6 These firms
receive criticism for turning away clients with meritorious claims
merely because they will not generate an adequate profit for the firm.
The second type consists of "wholesalers," which represent a large
number of claimants but invest few resources into individual cases. 20 7
As a result, these firms cut corners in their case preparation and may
prejudice particular plaintiffs who have stronger claims than others.20 8
Lastly, class actions in the mass product liability context are also
perceived as creating an incentive for attorneys to attain benefits for
their clients at the expense of future claimants. 0 9 Courts find this
problematic because no guarantee exists that the interests of the fu-
ture members will receive adequate protection or fair treatment.210
Future claims are exceptionally difficult because courts are often un-
202. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 559 (S.D. Fla.
1973) (stating that it was "aware of the potential for abuse that exists whenever a class
action arises"), aff'd mem., 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
203. Feinberg, supra note 189, at 83.
204. Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 584.
205. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settlement Threatens
Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 (recounting settlement nelotia-
tions that may have compromised individual claims and violated ethical obligations).
206. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1365.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir.) (questioning how "the due process rights of absentee inter-
ests can be protected and how absentees' represented status can be reconciled with a
litigation system premised on traditional bipolar litigation"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88
(1995).
210. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule
23, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 858, 886-87 (1995) ("The petition for certiorari fied by the
Agent Orange claimants, for example, said that the consequence of including their
claims was 'brutalizing individual rights.'" (citation omitted)).
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able to determine how many claimants have been exposed to a prod-
uct, how many will suffer harm, and what their damages will be.2 u
As a result, "there remains an overarching concernm-that absen-
tees' interests are being resolved and quite possibly bound by the op-
eration of res judicata even though most of the plaintiffs are not the
real parties to the suit."2'21 Accordingly, courts have been hesitant to
certify class actions if they believe that certification would disadvan-
tage future claimants.
F. The Lack of Finality
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions in particular have engendered criticism
for not providing final resolutions because this type of class action
allows class members to opt out and bring individual claims.2 13 The
opt out provision of Rule 23(c)(2) limits the courts' ability to achieve
global solutions in mass product liability litigation under Rule
23(b)(3).214 Thus, defendants have a strong incentive to resist class
certification because their exposure to liability does not end with the
resolution of the class action suit.
III. RULE 23 REDUX: ANSWERS TO COMMONLY RAISED
OBJECTIONS TO CLASS CERTIFICATION
Individually and collectively, the objections to the use of Rule
23(b)(3) reduce courts' willingness to invoke the class action vehicle in
mass product liability litigation. When considering whether to certify
a class, courts must confront numerous issues, including: the Notes to
Rule 23 which caution against utilizing the class action device in mass
tort litigation; a multiplicity of applicable state laws; the adequate pro-
tection of the interests of future claimants; concepts of individual jus-
tice; the risk that plaintiffs' attorneys will engage in collusion; and
intolerable settlement pressure on defendants. As a result, courts fail
to take full advantage of Rule 23(b)(3) in mass exposure cases.
A closer examination, however, reveals that none of these objec-
tions is insurmountable in light of the courts' powers under Rule 23,
including the courts' authority to grant partial certification of classes
with respect to certain issues and to certify subclasses. This part offers
211. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1048.
212. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
213. See Fed. R_ Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (granting opt out in class actions maintained under
23(b)(3)); Weinstein, supra note 30, at 135; see also Feinberg, supra note 189, at 87
(stating that one of the problems of voluntary class actions is that plaintiffs have a
right to opt out).
214. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 135; see also Valle Simms Dutcher, Comment, The
Asbestos Dragon: The Ramifications of Creative Judicial Management of Asbestos
Cases, 10 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 955, 951 (1993) (recounting that in the Dalkon Shield
litigation, the plaintiffs' counsel stated that they would recommend that their clients
opt out of the class if class certification were upheld).
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answers to these commonly raised concerns. As this part demon-
strates, many of the most common objections to class certification are
misperceptions. Furthermore, courts have at their disposal the means
to ensure that their concerns are met.
A. The 1966 Amendment to Rule 23
Many courts have cited the Notes accompanying the 1966 Amend-
ment to Rule 23 as the basis for denying class certification under Rule
23(b)(3).215 The Notes have been the subject of considerable criticism
by courts and legal commentators, however, including the authors of
the original Notes.216
In In re School Asbestos Litigation,217 the Third Circuit upheld the
certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action to resolve asbestos claims
notwithstanding the Notes.21 8 The Third Circuit reasoned that in light
of the tremendous economies that may be achieved through class cer-
tification, reliance upon the rationale of the Notes should be reas-
sessed. Accordingly, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's
certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.21 9
Moreover, Rule 23 provides an avenue for courts to avoid the very
problems that motivated the Advisory Committee to include the
Notes in the Amendment to Rule 23. The Notes specifically seek to
prevent class certification if individual issues will eventually degener-
ate the class action suit into multiple lawsuits tried separately.2 0
Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), however, a court may partially certify a class
only to resolve certain issues.22' Consequently, a court may determine
what issues are common to all class members, and exclusively certify a
215. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Sug-
gested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort
Litigation, 25 Harv. J. on Legis. 461, 461-62 (1988) (praising judges who have certified
class actions in the mass product liability context despite the admonition of Rule 23,
because the Notes do not recognize the practical problems inherent in bringing indi-
vidual actions in mass tort litigation). One member of the advisory committee has
stated:
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when
Rule 23 was amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee Note
saying that mass torts are inappropriate for class certification. I thought then
that was true. I am profoundly convinced now that that is untrue. Unless we
can use the class action and devices built on the class action, our judicial
system is simply not going to be able to cope with the challenge of the mass
repetitive wrong that we see in this case and so many others that have been
mentioned this morning and afternoon.
Charles Alan Wright, In re School Asbestos Litigation Master File 830268 (E.D. Pa.)
Class Action Argument, July 30, 1984, in Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.06, at
17-20.
217. 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986).
218. Id. at 1008-19.
219. Id.
220. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3), advisory committee's notes (1966 amendment).
221. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
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class to determine those questions. The court could refuse to certify
issues that require independent treatment, such as determining indi-
vidual damages and proximate cause.
Thus, courts have recognized that the efficiency of Rule 23 may
warrant a reassessment of the continuing vitality of the Notes. More-
over, courts may partially certify classes to resolve common issues, to
account for the underlying concerns of the Notes' authors. Accord-
ingly, courts should not perceive the Notes as a bar to employing Rule
23(b)(3) in mass product liability litigation.
B. The Theory of Individual Justice
Another frequently cited objection to class certification is that it
sacrifices individuals' control over their suits because they are forced
to participate in a large mass tort class.22 This argument ignores the
reality that clients often lack independent control over their suits,
even in the absence of a certified class actionm "Almost everyone
who has had contact with plaintiffs of tort litigation at the trial court
level would admit that, ultimately, everyone and everything but the
injured plaintiff controls the litigation."' 4
This objection is also overcome by the plaintiffs' opportunity to pro-
tect themselves by opting out under the provisions of Rule 23(c)(2).22
Furthermore, if a court chooses only to certify certain issues under
Rule 23(c)(4)(A), individuals will retain independent control over all
other aspects of their litigation except the issue certified. For exam-
ple, if a court certifies a class to resolve only the negligence of the
manufacturers at relevant times, individuals would maintain control
over aspects of their suit such as damage determinations and findings
of proximate cause. Accordingly, courts should not view the loss of
individual control over a plaintiff's suit as a meaningful obstacle to
certifying class actions.
C. The Determination of Applicable Law
A difficult issue that arises in mass product liability litigation is de-
termining which substantive law to apply. In mass product liability
cases, geographic diversity may exist between both defendants and
plaintiffs and among individual plaintiff class members. As a result,
various states' substantive law may be applicable to a single litiga-
222. Schultz, supra note 16, at 595-96; Transgrud, supra note 154, at 74-75.
223. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 595-96 (finding that the majority of mass tort
plaintiffs felt they had little or no control over the handling of their cases).
224. Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D.
323, 330 n.23 (1983).
225. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Weinstein, supra note 30, at 134-35.
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tion.2 6 A federal court can, however, certify subclasses using Rule
23(c)(4)(B) to account for variances in state law.227 The court in In re
School Asbestos Litigation indicated its willingness to certify sub-
classes based on distinctions in state law as the need arose.2 2 8
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged the complexity that the dis-
trict court would encounter in applying various state laws, the circuit
court believed that "the effort may nonetheless prove successful." 9
The court in In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc.230 concurred with the
Third Circuit's view. In Copley, the court reevaluated its decision to
certify a class of plaintiffs suing the manufacturers of an asthma drug
in light of Rhone-Poulenc.231 The court stated that certain difficulties
"will be encountered in trying to condense the negligence standards of
different jurisdictions, but classes based on such standards have been
certified before.
2 32
Additionally, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 33 the Supreme
Court stated that "We must first determine whether [a state's] law
conflicts in any material way with any other law which could apply.
There can be no injury in applying [a state's] law if it is not in conflict
with that of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit."234 As a re-
226. See Mullinex, supra note 166, at 785 (noting that "theoretically, it is possible
for the law of all fifty states to be available in [a] consolidated federal diversity mass
tort [case]").
227. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 554 (E.D. La. 1995) (not-
ing that Rule 23(c)(4)(B) "provides the Court with the option of dividing the class
into subclasses if appropriate after the Court resolves the conflict of laws issue").
228. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 852 (1986) (Asbestos II). Arguably, that need will not arise often. See In re
School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (Asbestos I) (stating that
"51 jurisdictions are in virtual agreement that they apply the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 388"), modified, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); In re
Lilco Securities Litig., 111 F.R.D. 663, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that applying the
law of all 50 states does not make class per se unmanageable).
229. Asbestos II, 789 F.2d at 1010-11; see also Asbestos 1, 104 F.R.D. at 434 (holding
that "substantial duplication" of negligence and strict liability laws in 51 jurisdictions
does not make nationwide class unmanageable). As a result, in Rhone-Poulenc, Judge
Grady could have certified subclasses of plaintiffs if the defendants could point out
any difference in negligence standards among the 50 states. Judge Grady was already
prepared to certify subclasses to account for the variation between states that adhere
to a professional standard of negligence and those that provide for an ordinary stan-
dard of care.
230. 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).
231. Id. at 460-61.
232. Id. at 461. Moreover, the court noted that even Judge Posner conceded that,
at some level, the law of negligence is not only nationwide, but worldwide. Id. at 460-
61.
233. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
234. Id. at 816. In a case following Shutts, the Supreme Court held that Kansas did
not violate its constitutional obligation to apply the substantive law of another state
because it viewed the other state's law as unestablished. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman,
486 U.S. 717, 731 (1988). Justice O'Connor dissented from this part of the opinion,
criticizing the majority's reasoning. O'Connor argued that the Court's decision would
permit a court that did not like another state's law to avoid applying it by inventing a
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suit, in the absence of a material conflict between state laws no consti-
tutional roadblock precludes the use of a uniform law.
Thus, two alternative avenues exist to certify Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions in mass product liability suits without offending the principles
of Erie or Shutts. First, if applicable law does not materially conflict
with that of other states, Shutts permits the use of a unified legal stan-
dard. Alternatively, if state laws do materially vary, a court could cer-
tify subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B) to account for these variations.
D. The Protection of Defendants from Settlement Pressure and
Fiscal Detriment
Courts and legal commentators have also cited the need to protect
defendants against "blackmail settlements" and bankruptcy as factors
militating against allowing class action treatment in mass product lia-
bility litigation 35 For example, in Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner ex-
pressed concern that certification of a class action would subject the
defendants to intolerable settlement pressure and possible bank-
ruptcy. 36 He was particularly concerned with these possibilities be-
cause he doubted the merit of the plaintiffs' claim3 7
Judge Posner's concerns about blackmail settlements are open to
more than one interpretation. Arguably, Judge Posner evaluated the
merits of the case under Rule 23(b)(3) as only one factor involved in
the determination of whether the class action vehicle was a superior
method to resolve the controversy.238 Judge Posner apparently rea-
soned that class action treatment would give undue weight to a poten-
tial single victory for plaintiffs; the corresponding increase in
defendants' risk would lead them to accept an extortionate settlement.
He indicated that individual actions taking place in various districts
nationwide would achieve a more representative national consensus
on whether plaintiffs had suffered a legally cognizable injuryP19
Judge Posner's reasoning, however, ignores the leverage that plain-
tiffs already enjoy under the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estop-
pel. Offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel permits all later
novel legal theory that the state had not considered and predict that the state would
adopt that theory. Id. at 749.
235. See e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-1300 (7th Cir.)
(noting that the "small probability of an immense judgment in a class action" may
lead to "an intense pressure to settle"), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995); Fiss, supra
note 185, at 1075.
236. 51 F.3d at 1298. Notably, intolerable settlement pressure only exists in cases
that defendants feel compelled to settle a case that lacks legal merit, or for a higher
amount than the actual claims are worth. Settlement pressure is proper, however, if
the amount of damage requested is reflective of the defendants' responsibility.
237. See id.
238. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1438-39.
239. 51 F.3d at 1298-1300.
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plaintiffs to take advantage of a single victory.240 At least in a class
action, however, defendants are aware that the entire controversy is at
stake and can deploy their resources and assess their risks accordingly.
Further, if defendants win the class action, all plaintiffs are bound un-
less they exercised their right to opt out.
One district court has subsequently determined that Judge Posner's
concern that class certification placed the fate of an industry in a sin-
gle jury's hands "is not a legal basis" for denying class certification
under Rule 23(b)(3).241 In In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc.,2 the
court criticized Judge Posner's solicitude for defendants' economic
welfare as evidence of a "profound mistrust of the jury system. 243
In fact, Judge Posner may have usurped the jury's function alto-
gether. An alternative analysis of his preoccupation with the plain-
tiffs' losing record arguably indicates that what Judge Posner really did
was prematurely and improperly decide the merits of the case. The
Supreme Court specifically prohibited this type of preliminary merits
inquiry in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.2' In Eisen, the Court stated:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained
as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the Rule by
allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class
action without first satisfying the requirements for it.245
Thus, Judge Posner's reasoning may run afoul of Eisen.
Regardless of whether Judge Posner's concern for the merits of the
plaintiffs' case is proper, the Seventh Circuit could have assuaged its
concern for "blackmail settlements" by employing alternative proce-
dures to combat intolerable settlement pressure.2 46 The Seventh Cir-
240. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). In Parklane, the
Supreme Court stated that offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel may be applied if
the plaintiff could not have easily joined in the earlier action and if application of the
doctrine would not be unfair to the defendant. Id. The court listed several factors that
would mitigate against the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel: (1) the existence of
"wait and see" plaintiffs; (2) the defendants were only sued for small or nominal dam-
ages in the first suit and had little incentive to defend vigorously; (3) the judgment is
inconsistent with other judgments in favor of the defendants; or (4) procedural oppor-
tunities are available in the subsequent actions that were not available in the first. Id.
at 330-21.
241. In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 460 (D. Wyo. 1995).
242. 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).
243. Id. at 460 n.4.
244. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
245. Id. at 177-78; see also Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 460 (stating that the merits of
plaintiffs claim cannot be considered when determining whether to certify a class
action).
246. Class Actions-Class Certification of Mass Torts-Seventh Circuit Overturns
Rule 23(b)(3) Certification of a Plaintiff Class of Hemophiliacs-In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995), 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 870, 874 (1996).
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cuit could have encouraged district courts to use summary judgment
more freely to dispose of claims that lack legal merit." 7 Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit could have instructed district courts to scrutinize
any proposed settlement closely pursuant to the authority of Rule
23(e) and by that means reject a settlement that resulted from inap-
propriate pressure or tactics.2  While protecting defendants from ex-
tortionate settlements is an important interest, courts should not
ignore alternative means to combat possible "blackmail settlements"
in favor of denial of the class action vehicle to plaintiffs in the absence
of any evidence of an intent to exact such a settlement.
E. The Incentives for Unethical Behavior
The additional concern that class certification creates incentives for
attorneys to engage in unethical behavior is overstated. Courts should
not assume that class actions will lay the foundation for unethical be-
havior, including claim solicitation, collusion, or improperly dis-
advantaging future claimants. Active judicial oversight of a class
action may prevent these abuses.
In fact, judges are less able to identify and correct these problems in
individual suits. If a class action is certified under the power of one
judge in one court, that judge will be in a superior position to identify
these abuses or prevent them from occurring. For instance, under
Rule 23(e), judges must approve of any settlements between the par-
ties.249 The Third Circuit has recognized that the "expanded role of
the court in class actions . . . continues even after certification."' 0
Thus, judges presiding over a class action may reject a settlement if
they believe the attorneys engaged in unethical behavior during settle-
ment negotiations or acted to prejudice the interests of their clients.25 1
A judge may similarly protect the interests of future claimants
under Rule 23(e).32 A judge may choose to reject a settlement that
247. Id.
248. Id. at 875.
249. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Wveinstein, supra note 135, at 136 (stating that "the
class action explicitly provides for judicial supervision to ensure some degree of fair-
ness and control over attorneys' fees ... the judge can ensure... fees [are] commen-
surate to the savings that economies of scale of shared discovery, experts, and so on
should engender"). Moreover, courts must decide whether a settlement is fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate. See; e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F2d 1079,
1085 (2d Cir.) (noting that '[tihese terms are general and can not be measured scien-
tifically"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
250. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 785 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 88 (1995).
251. See id ("Courts and commentators have interpreted this rule to require courts
to 'independently and objectively analyze the evidence and circumstances before it in
order to determine whether the settlement is in the best interest of those whose
claims will be extinguished.'" (quoting Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 1lA1, at
11-88 to 11-89)).
252. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); General Motors, 55 F.3d at 785 ("Under Rule 23(e)
the district court acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of
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trammels the interests of future claimants. 3 In addition, a class ac-
tion suit may protect future claimants by avoiding a race to judgment
that occurs as the result of individual adjudication. If cases are indi-
vidually tried, the first big judgment could deplete a defendant's re-
sources and eliminate funds available to compensate future claimants.
Under class proceedings, however, a court may establish a trust fund
to ensure that resources are available to compensate future victims at
a time when they can prove their damages.' Further, the notice to
all class members required by Rule 23(c)(2) alerts potential class
members of their opportunity to file suit.155
A judge presiding over a class action will be in a better position to
correct and punish any ethical impropriety that occurs within a class
proceeding. 6 Moreover, she will have the means to bind each party
under the authority of Rule 23. The multiplicity of judges involved in
individual suits are less able to counter these risks because they lack
the means to supervise and control any of them. Thus, class actions
do not present unavoidable risks of collusion, claim solicitation, and
harm to the interests of future claimants.
G. The Opt Out and Final Resolution of Claims
Although defendants usually challenge plaintiffs' petitions for class
certification,2 7 defendants may derive significant benefits from class
action treatment of mass product liability claims. Class certification
provides the advantage of offering defendants the opportunity to vin-
dicate themselves in one suit, as opposed to defending hundreds of
absent class members." (quoting Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d
114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975))).
253. A judge presiding over a class action can protect the absentees' due process
rights by ensuring that the named plaintiffs are sufficiently interested to monitor the
attorneys and have interests sufficiently aligned with the absentees so as to assure that
monitoring serves the interest of the class as a whole. See General Motors, 55 F.3d at
784.
254. Trust funds have also been created during bankruptcy proceedings involving
defendant manufacturers. See, e.g., World News Saturday: Strategic Bankruptcy (ABC
television broadcast, June 3, 1995) ("Patricia Houser, Manville Trust: And we now
have over $3 billion available to pay the expected half-a-million claims well into the
next century."); Keep it Alive, Make it Pay, The Plain Dealer, May 20, 1995, at 10B
("Dow Coming Corp.'s decision to file for bankruptcy protection this week doesn't
mean that all is lost for the thousands of plaintiffs who have sued company... if Dow
Coming comes out of the reorganization with a healthy trust fund, like the $2.5 billion
one created by onetime asbestos giant Manville Corp., bankruptcy might eventually
be a win-win situation for both parties.").
255. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
256. Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 584 (stating that "judicial scrutiny of pro-
posed settlement distributions are effective safeguards").
257. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1294 (7th Cir.) (decer-
tifying class of HIV-infected hemophiliacs on defendants' motion), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D. Wyo. 1995)(denying defendants' motion to decertify a class of plaintiffs who used a defective
bronchodilator).
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individual suits. 5 Granted, because class actions certified under
Rule 23(b)(3) allow plaintiffs to opt out, one trial may not provide a
complete resolution of the litigation. Under class action management,
however, many claims against defendants are subject to a single reso-
lution, allowing defendants the capacity to cap their exposure to liabil-
ity, reduce uncertainty, and limit transaction costs. 59
Moreover, if a high number of class members choose to opt out, and
the class action device no longer appears to provide an appropriate
solution, a judge may revoke class certification,260 A judge overseeing
a class may determine that if too many class members opt out, the
class action vehicle may no longer provide the superior method to liti-
gate the claims. This problem will not occur often, however, because
few claimants typically opt out of a reasonably run class action.2 6'
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) cannot provide a complete reso-
lution of every claim against a particular defendant. Nevertheless,
class certification may resolve a great number of the claims and signif-
icantly benefit both plaintiffs and defendants.
IV. THE CASE FOR APPLYING RULE 23(b)(3) CLASS AcTiONS IN
MASS PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION
Commentators have advanced various proposals that would
increase the civil justice system's ability to process mass product liabil-
ity claims more efficiently.262 These proposals range from adopting
258. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 135.
259. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1050 ("[G]lobal settlements are attractive
even when the price is high, because they offer the opportunity to reduce uncertainty
and limit transactions costs.").
260. See Fed. 1R Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (d). This type of class action is revocable under
the discretion of the judge.
261. See Weinstein, supra note 30, at 136.
262. See infra notes 264-66.
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new procedural rules,263 to revising the application of existing rules,264
to creating new fora to process mass torts.265 Currently, none of these
proposals appears to enjoy strong support. As a result, judges are left
to adopt other means of resolving mass product liability litigation.
These dispositions are typically negotiated settlements. Such settle-
263. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1055-56. Several proposals have
sought to permit "multidistricting" tort claims across federal and state jurisdictions-
not only for pretrial management, but for trial as well. Id. at 1055. In 1989, the Amer-
ican Bar Association Commission of Mass Torts drafted a recommendation for Con-
gressional approval of federal court jurisdiction for litigation that involved over 250
claims arising out of a single accident or exposure to one product. Id. In 1991, the
House considered establishing federal jurisdiction over mass disaster claims that in-
volved more than 25 deaths or injuries resulting from a single accident at a discrete
location. Cases were to be transferred to a single jurisdiction for a determination of
liability and punitive damages. Cases would be remanded to their original court to
determine other damages. Id. The American Law Institute has recommended that
Congress adopt a uniform federal choice of law code for complex litigation. Id. at
1056. These proposals have only engendered slight support, however.
Other legal commentators have advocated creation of a federal common law.
Schultz, supra note 16, at 604; see also Mullenix, supra note 166, at 760 (discussing a
"series of qualified arguments supporting federalization of mass tort litigation");
Aaron D. Twerski, With Liberty and Justice For All: An Essay on Agent Orange and
Choice of Law, 52 Brook. L. Rev. 341, 366 (1986) (discussing Judge Weinstein's crea-
tion of a national consensus law in the Agent Orange litigation); Georgene M. Vairo,
Multi- Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal
Common Law?, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 167, 201 (1985) (stating that "the federal courts
must be allowed to consider whether to develop and apply federal common law").
264. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1052-55. For instance, judges could
invoke Federal Rule 42(a) with greater frequency to consolidate cases. In Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), Judge Robert Parker of the East-
ern District of Texas consolidated approximately 2000 asbestos claims. Id. at 653.
Judge Parker selected 160 cases to represent the aggregated claims and tried these
cases in multiple phases. Id. One jury determined the defendants were liable during
Phase I, and then determined a schedule that would calculate punitive damages. Id.
In Phase II, a second jury heard evidence regarding the plaintiffs' exposure to the
defendants' products, and then heard evidence regarding contributory negligence. Id.
In Phase III, a jury determined damages for individuals and corresponding "disease
categories." Id The plaintiffs whose cases were tried recovered the amount provided
by the jury. Id The nonrepresentative cases were awarded the average amount that
corresponded with their type of injury. Id. This type of aggregation has not engen-
dered much support from practitioners or judges. See also Hensler & Peterson, supra
note 1, at 1054 ("Leading mass tort practitioners and judges with prior experience in
dealing with such cases evince little enthusiasm for replicating the experience.").
265. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1059. Some commentators have sug-
gested establishing a master disaster court that would exclusively resolve mass per-
sonal injury claims. See, e.g., Ralph I. Lancaster & Catherine R. Connors, Creation of
a National Disaster Court: A Response to "Judicial Federalism in Action", 78 Va. L.
Rev. 1753, 1754 (1992) (advocating that one disaster court be established to resolve
mass personal injury claims). A radical proposal for resolving mass tort claims is to
substitute statutory administrative compensation schemes for tort law. See, e.g., Les-
ter Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A Proposal to the
United States Congress, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (1992) (proposing the creation of an
industry-financed trust fund to pay for the damages). Lastly, claims resolutions facili-
ties may offer administrative compensation schedules and alternative dispute resolu-
tion. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Foreword, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn
1990, at 1, 2 (discussing the advisability of creating claims resolution facilities).
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ments do not offer plaintiffs the opportunity to voice their claims pub-
licly, nor do they offer defendants the opportunity to vindicate
themselves expressly.266 Moreover, defendants may face pressure to
settle cases that have little legal merit, and plaintiffs often accept com-
pensation that poorly reflects their current and future losseS.267
Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4)(A) offer judges a vehicle by which to
process and resolve mass product liability litigation, in appropriate
cases, in a superior manner than is available through other means of
adjudication. The Supreme Court has stated that class actions serve
important objectives, including "the protection of the defendant from
inconsistent obligations, the protection of the interests of absentees,
the provision of a convenient and economical means for disposing of
similar lawsuits and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs
among numerous litigants with similar claims. '2  Free use of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions to resolve common issues in mass product liabil-
ity litigation would provide a more fairly balanced forum for the reso-
lution of defendants' and plaintiffs' claims.6 9 Plaintiffs would benefit
from the economies of scale granted by Rule 23(b)(3). Defendants
would have the opportunity to bind all class members that have not
chosen to opt out and to vindicate themselves with respect to certain
issues in one suit. In addition, if a court partially certifies a class to
resolve select issues, class certification can maximize the advantages
of aggregating claims, while protecting parties with stronger individual
claims or defenses against their adversaries.270
Employing Rule 23(b)(3) class actions in the mass product liability
context provides numerous advantages to all parties involved in the
resolution of mass product liability litigation, including the
overburdened judicial system. The many advantages of certifying
class actions to resolve mass product liability claims will be discussed
below.
A. Avoiding Expensive, Repetitive Litigation
A high degree of commonality of factual issues and legal questions
is present in most mass product liability claims.27' Similar injuries
266. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1032.
267. See i. (stating that "mass personal litigation inevitably becomes more of a
financial transaction than a dispute over defendants' culpability and plaintiffs' mone-
tary and nonmonetary losses").
268. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980).
269. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
270. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 742-43 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1987); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472-73 (5th
Cir. 1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.RD. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
271. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 966-67.
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will involve similar causation issues, 272 and similar liability issues will
be present if plaintiffs' injuries resulted from exposure to a particular
product manufactured by a defendant. 273 Because the facts and liabil-
ity issues are common to most plaintiffs, the legal strategy employed
by all claimants will most likely be similar.274 Moreover, under Rule
23(c)(4)(A), a court can determine what common issues exist and only
partially certify a class only to resolve those questions.
Accordingly, certification of class actions would avoid repetitive,
time consuming, and expensive litigation.275 Allowing individual cases
to proceed independently where each case repeats the same evidence
and legal theories is indefensible.276 By preventing parties from liti-
gating the same claims thousands of times, class actions allow plain-
tiffs and defendants to reduce notoriously high costs in mass product
liability litigation.277 If mass product liability litigation proceeds on an
individual case basis, the burden of duplicative litigation is enor-
mous.2 78 Courts that cling to the concept that each case must involve
individual discovery, trial, and appeal processes often delay or deny
victims compensation and thereby compromise the interests of
justice.279
Class action certification enables a court with an overburdened
docket to process cases more quickly.280 Class action certification de-
creases the number of repetitive suits that consume public resources
and deprive other claimants of access to justice by crowding the
courts' dockets.2s Moreover, an overburdened judicial system may
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 (1982); In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995) ("Class certification enables courts to treat common
claims together, obviating the need for repeated adjudications of the same issues.");
Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 1.06, at 1-17 to 1-19.
276. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.01, at 17-3 to 17-4 ("The interests of
justice are not furthered by the needless, time-consuming repetition of evidence and
repeated litigation of issues in individual trials on a one-by-one basis which are com-
mon to the claims of all affected.").
277. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 563.
278. Id. These costs particularly affect plaintiffs. See infra notes 292-96 and accom-
panying text.
279. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.01, at 17-3 to 17-4.
280. Schultz, supra note 16, at 556 n.14; see also Feinberg, supra note 189, at 82
("Litigation of mass tort controversies involving hundreds or thousands of claims in a
single forum or proceeding severely stresses traditional legal procedures and
conventions.").
281. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir.) ("Determination
of the liability issues in one suit may represent a substantial savings in time and re-
sources."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 564
("The redundant adjudication of mass tort claims thus consumes vast quantities of
public resources, raising the price of access for other, sporadic, types of tort claims.").
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have to adopt procedures that discourage people from resorting to the
judicial system, even if they need it.3s
By reducing the cost of litigation, class certification opens access to
the civil justice system to those injured parties who might otherwise be
unable to sue.3 In In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc.,8s the court
stated that the most convincing reason for certifying the class was of-
fered by plaintiffs' counsel who stated that "without class certification
his clients would essentially lose their claims because neither he nor
his clients had the resources to sue a large defendant like Copley."M
Mass product liability cases typically involve complex factual and legal
questions that "are exceedingly, if not prohibitively, expensive" for
individuals to litigate independently.' Mass product liability per-
sonal injury cases also present difficulties in proving causation and
crafting remedies, further elevating the cost of litigating such a case.2s7
Thus, high costs greatly reduce the incentive for plaintiffs to bring in-
dividual suits and decrease the recovery for the victims litigating the
claim.2ss In addition, if cases are brought individually, defendants
may be subject to a "punishing surcharge," from multiple punitive
damage awards and the costs associated with repeated litigation of
identical issues.2 9
Class certification also offers benefits that may not be attainable by
means of alternative methods of adjudication. The two methods of
adjudication that come closest to attaining benefits provided by class
actions are consolidation of cases and multidistrict litigation3m Both
of these procedures, however, fall short of providing certain advan-
tages unique to class actions. Multidistrict litigation fails to provide
the most efficient method to resolve mass product liability claims.
While multidistrict litigation may reduce the burdens of multiple pre-
trial proceedings, it does not extend similar efficiency to the expensive
282. See Feinberg, supra note 189, at 82 (stating that "[t]he sheer number of parties
alone can make even the most routine pretrial discovery proceeding or motion hear-
ing exceedingly burdensome, and often ties up judicial resources to the detriment of
litigants in other cases").
283. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 570 (stating that "cost barriers are
compounded by other prevalent conditions, such as the low income status of a signifi-
cant number of the victims, and the relatively low probability of success at trial that
characterizes these legally and factually complex cases").
284. 161 F.RLD 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).
285. Id. at 466.
286. Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 563.
287. Id.
288. For example, in asbestos litigation, the plaintiffs received only 39% of their
award after deducting litigation expenses. James S. Kakalik et a4, Variation in Asbes-
tos Litigation, Compensation and Expenses 89 (1984).
289. Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 564; see also Marcus, supra note 210, at 861
(discussing that there is no "right" to punitive damages, and thus, a defendant should
not be subject to multiple punitive damages for a unified course of conduct).
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994) (providing for multidistrict litigation); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 42(a) (providing for consolidation of cases).
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and onerous trial process. In addition, consolidating cases may not
achieve certain benefits attainable by class actions. The efficiency of
consolidating cases affects only those cases that a jurisdiction attempts
to resolve in one trial. Unless all cases are subject to consolidated
trial in one jurisdiction, which is not likely to occur, the mechanism
will not achieve the same conservation of judicial resources as a Rule
23(b)(3) class action. Moreover, neither method of adjudication pro-
vides a court with the power to oversee and limit attorney's fees or to
confine common resolution to common issues.
As a result, the invocation of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions in the mass
product liability context achieves maximum benefits for both parties
by providing a single forum in which to litigate a mass product liability
claim, significantly reducing transaction costs, and opening access to
the civil justice system.29' Moreover, the judicial efficiency achieved
by aggregating claims provides benefits that extend beyond the parties
involved in the litigation to other participants in the civil justice sys-
tem who might otherwise be deprived of access to a system that is
often overburdened by resolving numerous mass product liability
claims.
B. Leveling the Playing Field Between Plaintiffs and Defendants
The current civil justice system, focused on individual justice, does
not allow plaintiffs to aggregate their claims fully. Defendants, how-
ever, may spread their litigation costs over the entire class of mass
product liability claims. 2 Most liability issues and their correspond-
ing defenses will be substantially the same for all claims in a mass
exposure suit, thereby allowing defendants to develop fully one de-
fense to all claims.2 93 For instance, in the asbestos litigation, the de-
fendants "organized into a consortium to pursue common defense and
settlement strategies, united behind a single counsel. ' 294 As a result,
defendants involved in mass product liability litigation are "repeat
players." 95 The advantage of being a "repeat player" is that these
parties only need to develop one defense; thus, they are in a financial
position to invest more in developing that single legal strategy. These
savings place the defendants in a position to finance a "war of attri-
tion" through costly discovery and motion practice that depletes their
adversary's financial resources.2 96 By contrast, plaintiffs are only one
time players, who must finance their case from beginning to end, in-
291. See Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 17.03, at 17-10 to 17-11.
292. Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 564.
293. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1365. John Coffee noted that in cases involving
asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, and Bendectin, the litigation often may focus on one
defendant and negotiations would be with a single defense counsel. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 571.
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cluding having to stave off defendants' attempt to finance a "war of
attrition." In In re Copley, the court recognized that to permit the
defendant to contest liability against each claimant in an independent
suit would give defendants an advantage equivalent to excluding cer-
tain claimants from the civil justice system.
Defendants also may benefit from class action treatment. Under
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, if defendants win the class action all plain-
tiffs are bound unless they exercise their right to opt out.29s Accord-
ingly, class certification allows defendants to translate one win to a
widespread victory. Consequently, Rule 23(b)(3) provides a neces-
sary means to level the playing field between defendants and plaintiffs
in mass product liability litigation.
C. Ensuring that Plaintiffs Achieve Full and Fair Compensation
The civil justice system does not adequately compensate victims
when courts disfavor class certification in the mass product liability
context. High transaction costs plague the system, often with the re-
sult that attorneys for both parties benefit most from case-by-case ad-
judication of mass product liability claims.2' Defense lawyers may
exploit their hourly fee arrangements by preparing for numerous indi-
vidual trials. Plaintiffs' attorneys are more in demand if claims are
taken to court on a case-by-case basis as opposed to one class
action.3 oo
Rule 23(e), however, provides courts with the opportunity to limit
the number of attorneys involved in a class action suit and the power
to control attorneys' fees as part of a class proceeding. 3 1 In addition,
a judge presiding over a class action may ensure that attorneys' fees
are commensurate with the savings engendered by consolidation of
expenses, including discovery and expert witnesses.3
Moreover, in the absence of class certification, plaintiffs frequently
endure longer delays in receiving their just compensation. 3  In fact,
297. In re Copley Pharmaceutical, 161 F.R.D. 456, 466 (D. Wyo. 1995); see also
Weeks v. Bareco Oil, 125 F.2d 83, 90 (7th Cir. 1941) (requiring plaintiffs to bring
individual suits would exclude many small claimants from attaining justice).
298. Notably, few class members typically opt out of a reasonably run class action.
See Weinstein, supra note 30, at 136.
299. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1031.
300. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 571 ("Class treatment of mass tort
claims from a particular accident require only a fraction of the legal services provided
by plaintiff attorneys compared to case-by-case adjudication, which disperses claims
widely over territory and time.").
301. See Fed. R Civ. P. 23(e); Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, 721 F.2d
881, 884 (2d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984); Individual Justice, supra note
26, at 571-72.
302. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 136.
303. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 562.
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many victims will die before receiving any compensation at all.3° For
example, in Rhone-Poulenc, in the absence of class certification, years
may pass before the plaintiffs recover-years these individuals who
are infected with HIV and are often in late stages of AIDS-do not
have.
Class certification ensures that plaintiffs, rather than their attorneys,
will receive most of the compensation awarded in a case.30 5 More-
over, class actions provide a vehicle that allows courts to process mass
exposure claims more quickly. Therefore, classes should be certified
in mass product liability litigation to ensure that plaintiffs with merito-
rious claims may, at the very least, live to see their compensation.
D. Providing an Incentive For Companies To Make Their
Product Safer
Class action certification in mass product liability litigation is also
necessary for the tort system to serve its deterrent function. 30 6 The
threat of mass liability provides an incentive for firms to take due care
to investigate how to make their product safe and avoid injury to the
consumers of their product.30 7 Although the potential for mass liabil-
ity may frighten insurers and manufacturers from research and devel-
opment in some product lines and markets, 30 mass liability also
provides a necessary deterrent to irresponsible, dangerous behavior
on the part of companies. Without providing the class action as a ve-
hicle to bring these claims, many plaintiffs simply would not sue. 30 9 A
reduction in claims decreases the defendant company's incentive to
take safety precautions.310 Sporadic claims against a corporation do
not provide a sufficient deterrent.311 Paying claims in several individ-
ual lawsuits is a small price in comparison to the profits often realized
as a result of the company's imprudent behavior.312
The civil justice system must provide adequate deterrence to keep
companies from developing and marketing unsafe products. 313 In the
304. Id. at 562. Four hundred asbestos plaintiffs involved in the case of Cimino v.
Raymark Industries, 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), died while waiting for their
cases to be heard. Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecog-
nized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev.
815, 819 (1992). The Cimino case did not involve a class action because the Fifth
Circuit decertified the class originally certified by the District Court. Id. at 819-20.
305. See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
306. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 565.
307. Id. at 573 ("Accordingly, the threat of liability should induce firms engaged in
risky activities to take due or optimal care by investing in safety precautions.").
308. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 961.
309. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
310. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 573.
311. See id.
312. See infra notes 316-23 and accompanying text.
313. Trends in Tort Litigation, supra note 1, at 32 ("To many scholars, attorneys,
and litigants, deterrence is a central concern: The system has a clearly stated interest
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absence of the deterrence provided by the civil justice system, these
companies are left to purely market driven incentives to make their
product safer.31 The harms that may occur when companies are left
to self-regulation are evident in the Rhone-Poulenc case and in In re
Northern District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability
Litigation.15
In the Rhone-Poulenc case, the manufacturers of AHF failed to in-
activate viruses in their blood product, not because they did not
posses the technology, but because they felt it was not cost effec-
tive.316 The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") did not provide
effective or sufficient deterrence, because once the pharmaceutical
companies proved a minimum level of "safety," the FDA did not in-
quire whether the companies at any time could have made the product
still safer.31 7 The FDA was actually satisfied with the safety of AHF
because it only contained some "tolerable" viruses, including the
deadly Hepatitis B virus-not knowing that one of those viruses,
HIV, would later have devastating effects on the hemophiliac
population.1
A similar situation ensued in Northern District of California,
Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation.319 Hugh Davis, in-
ventor of the Dalkon Shield, studied the safety and effectiveness of his
product.32 Davis, however, had falsified the results of his studies. 1
At the time Davis' product was approved for marketing, the FDA did
,, ,,322
not have the authority to regulate "medical devices. As a result,
in trying to deter manufacturers from making bad products; to deter doctors from
practicing bad medicine; to deter businesses from trying inappropriate practices.").
314. See Shaw, supra note 74, at E2 (recounting that manufacturers of AHF did not
research ways to make their product safer until they projected a loss of business
should the competing companies develop a safer product first).
315. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
316. See Shaw, supra note 74, at E2 ("No medical, economic or social reason could
justify ever using ... unheated, pooled plasma or its clotting roducts .... Large
pools are highly profitable, but they are medically bankrupt." (citation omitted)).
317. kL (stating that "officials at the FDA 'tended to drag their feet'-and were too
chummy with industry" (quoting Thomas C. Drees, first president of Alpha Thera-
peutics Corp., a manufacturer of AHF)).
318. Id. ("It wasn't long, though, before hepatitis from blood products had become
a leading killer of hemophiliacs. But the government, manufacturers of the blood-
clotting concentrates, and some doctors called this an acceptable risk, given the
medicine's hugh benefits, and federal regulators allowed the medicines to be sold,
with labels warning about hepatitis.").
319. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
320. See Morton Mintz, At Any Cost: Corporate Greed, Women and The Dalkon
Shield 115 (1985); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1018.
321. Mlntz, supra note 320, at 115; Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1018.
322. Prior to 1976, Congress lacked the power to regulate medical devices. Robert
W. Stewart, Report Attacks Sale of Faulty Heart Devices, L.A. Tunes, Feb. 26, 1990, at
A3. Congress adopted the Medical Device Amendments in 1976, however, which
closed this loophole. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1017-18 nn.290-91.
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Robins was allowed to put an untested product on the market that
eventually proved extremely dangerous. 2 3
Arguably, the goal of deterrence should receive more attention
than the goal of compensating victims.32 4 Money judgments can never
provide a perfect remedy to individuals harmed by the manufacturers
of defective products. 32 5 The use of the class action and the tort sys-
tem, however, may be more effective to prevent future, noncompensa-
ble, wrongful infliction of harm on individuals.326
Some commentators, however, disagree that deterrence is ever at-
tainable in the mass product liability context.327 Proponents of this
view argue that because there is a long latency period between a plain-
tiff's exposure to a harmful product and the time the negative effects
of the product become apparent, deterrence is not possible because
the product is typically no longer on the market.328 This argument
ignores the fact, however, that the deterrent effect does not necessar-
ily have to discourage the defendants from acting in a safe manner
with respect to the actual product or accident that gave rise to that
particular action. The deterrent effect created by the possibility of
mass liability should carry over to the company's behavior in all areas.
In light of the numerous advantages provided by Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions as well as the methods by which courts may overcome tradi-
tional objections to class certification, courts should exercise their dis-
cretion to certify Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to resolve mass product
liability claims. Often certain issues, including the liability of the de-
fendants, are common to the entire class and warrant partial certifica-
tion under Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4)(A). The next section argues
that the advantages of Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4)(A) could have
been beneficial in resolving common issues in Rhone-Poulenc. This
next section argues that the potential class met Rule 23(a)'s prerequi-
sites in addition to falling within the parameters of a Rule 23(b)(3)
323. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 1, at 1018.
324. See Individual Justice, supra note 26, at 580.
325. Id. at 580 ("Because money judgments can never in principle or reality pro-
vide a perfect substitute for the right not to be wrongfully harmed in the first place, a
postulate of rights-based deterrence should supplement the traditional premises of
corrective justice.").
326. Id. at 580-81 ("Pursuant to this... theory... the function of the tort system is
to protect rights to personal security not only by compensation after-the-fact, but also
by policing the behavior of would-be rights violators to prevent wrongful infliction of
incompensable losses-harms which cannot be compensated ex post.").
327. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 25, at 962 ("A system designed to achieve correc-
tive justice goals in two-party accidental harm cases simply cannot be accommodated
effectively to the demands of mass tort cases [involving] ... long-latent toxic disor-
ders."): Robinson, supra note 25, at 785 ("[T]he deterrent value of legal penalties for
managerial error depends heavily on the proximity of the penalties to the actions for
which they are assessed.").
328. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1355-56.
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class action, and thus the Seventh Circuit should have permitted the
use of class certification in Rhone-Poulenc.
F. Denial to Apply Rule 23(b)(3) in Rhone-Poulenc Was Misguided
The potential class in Rhone-Poulenc should have been certified.
Judge Posner's reversal of the District Court's certification order was
misguided because the potential class met all of the requirements of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action. This section demonstrates that the class in
Rhone-Poulenc met the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a). Further-
more, this section demonstrates that class certification was proper
under Rule 23(b)(3) because it provided a superior method to resolve
the controversy and common issues predominated in the litigation.
In order for a class to meet Rule 23(a)'s first requirement of numer-
osity, the potential class must be so numerous that joinder of all mem-
bers is impracticable.3 29 "Rule 23(a)(1) requires, [however], only that
joinder of all members be difficult and impracticable, not impossi-
ble.1330 An estimated 20,000 persons in the United States have hemo-
philia, and almost half of them may be infected with HIV. 3  Some
potential class members may be unaware of their WHV status. 3 2 As a
result, many potential plaintiffs are not even known. Thus, the poten-
tial class met the numerosity requirement because joinder of unknown
plaintiffs is impracticable. 333
The second requirement of Rule 23(a), commonality, was also met
by the potential class.334 "The threshold of 'commonality' is not
high.... [T]he rule requires only that resolution of the common ques-
tions affect all or a substantial number of the class members. ' 3a  All
defendants, except the National Hemophilia Foundation, conceded
that the case presented common questions of law and fact.331 The Na-
tional Hemophilia Foundation argued that the determination of its lia-
329. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.RID. 410, 415 (N.D. IMI 1994),
rev'd sub noma. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F3d 1296 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
330. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R1D. 544, 550 (E.D. La. 1995); See
7A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1762 (1986).
331. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 415.
332. Id. at 416.
333. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410,416, rev'd sub nom. In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 116 S. Ct. 184
(1995); see also Jack v. American Linen Supply Co., 498 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1974)
("[J]oinder of unknown individuals is certainly impracticable. Thus the requirements
of Rule 23(a)(1) would appear to be met here."). Moreover, even if the case eventu-
ally involves only several hundred plaintiffs, joinder may still be impractical. The
Fifth Circuit recognized that "[t]he basic question is practicability of joinder, not
number of interested persons per se." Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F,2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
334. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
335. Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
336. See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 416.
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bility will involve different facts than those involved in the
determination of the pharmaceutical companies' negligence.337 The
essence of the case, however, rests upon one principal factual question
that applies to all defendants: What was the state of scientific knowl-
edge at various times concerning the presence and transmission of
HIV in AHIF? 338 Accordingly, the case satisfied the commonality
requirement.
The third requirement of Rule 23(a) is typicality.339 The typicality
requirement ensures that the class representatives will have claims
typical of absent class members.34 ° The claims of the representatives
and absent members need not be identical.341 According to Seventh
Circuit:
"A plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the same event or
practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other
class members and his or her claims are based on the same legal
theory." The typicality requirement may be satisfied even if there
are factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs
and those of other class members. Thus, similarity of legal theory
may control even in the face of differences of fact.342
The complaint in Rhone-Poulenc alleges that all class members suf-
fered injury as a result of the defendants' failure to screen high-risk
donors and deactivate viruses in AHF. Moreover, all class members
allege that the Foundation negligently failed to warn class members of
the dangers of treatment with AHF. Thus, the plaintiffs have met the
typicality requirement. 43
The final requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the class representatives
must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' "The
adequacy requirement mandates an inquiry into the zeal and compe-
tence of the representative's counsel and into the willingness and abil-
ity of the representative to take an active role in and control the
337. Id.
338. Id. The commonality requirement does not require all issues to be common to
all parties. See, e.g., Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The
commonality requirement focuses on the common issues relevant to claims by or
against the class members; it does not require that all issues be common to all par-
ties."); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
mere fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class remain after
the common questions of the defendant's liability have been resolved does not dictate
the conclusion that a class action is impermissible.").
339. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
340. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. 410, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
341. Id.
342. De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted).
343. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 417.
344. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
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litigation and protect the interests of absentees."" 5 Although factual
differences do exist among plaintiffs' claims, such as the severity of
their hemophilia and whether they used every brand of AHF, the
complaint confirms the participation of "at least one class representa-
tive for each base that needs to be covered." z 6 As a result, the propo-
nents of certification satisfied the adequacy requirement.
The potential class in Rhone-Poulenc also falls within the parame-
ters of a class action maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3). The questions
of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is su-
perior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.
Common issues must constitute a significant part of the individual
cases to predominate. 47 The defendant manufacturers have engaged
in similar conduct in their manufacture of AHF. "A major common
issue is whether that conduct was negligent."48 Moreover, all plain-
tiffs claim to have suffered injury in the same manner-they all have
contracted HIV through the use of the defendants' products.349 As a
result, the question regarding whether the defendants' conduct was
negligent is common to all members of the class.
The defendants allege, however, that questions such as proximate
cause raise individual issues.350 The defendants are correct that the
proximate cause question is not appropriate for class-wide adjudica-
tion because individual issues do predominate with respect to this is-
sue.351 Under the power of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), however, the court does
not need to certify a class to resolve the entire controversy. The court
can certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action to resolve only particular is-
345. Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F.2d 470, 484 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983) (citations omitted).
346. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. 410, 417 (N.D. IlM. 1994), rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 116 S. C. 184 (1995).
347. See Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1022 (5th Cir. 1992) ("In the con-
text of mass tort litigation, we have held that a class issue predominates if it consti-
tutes a significant part of the individual cases."); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d
468,472 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[i]n order to 'predominate,' common issues must
constitute a significant part of the individual cases"); In re School Asbestos Litig., 104
F.R.D. 422,431-32 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (noting that when "common questions ... [are] a
significant aspect of the case" certification is allowed), aff'd in part, revd in part, 789
F.2d 996 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); see also In re Tetracycline Cases, 107
F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that "the issues covered by the request be
such that their resolution (as a class matter) will materially advance a disposition of
the litigation as a whole").
348. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 418.
349. Id
350. See id. at 421.
351. Id. at 422. Each class member may confront formidable problems including
having to prove which company's negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.
The laws of the states are in complete disarray regarding the burden of proof facing a
plaintiff hoping to prove proximate cause. As a result, certification regarding this
issue is inappropriate. See id.
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sues, including the defendants' negligence. This concession does not
diminish the reality that without first proving the defendants' breach
or negligence, a question common to all class members, class members
will not even have the opportunity to present their individual cases
with respect to causation and damages."
The final question considered by a court when determining whether
a case is appropriate for class action treatment is whether the class
action vehicle is superior to all other available options for efficient
and fair adjudication of the controversy.353 Certification of the class
in Rhone-Poulenc under Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve issues that
predominate in the litigation was superior to other methods available.
A class action would provide the most efficient means to adjudicate
the issue of liability. If plaintiffs have to bring suits individually, both
parties will be forced to litigate "over and over again the same ques-
tions of what was known, when it was known, what should have been
done, when it should have been done, and whether it would have
worked in any event. '354 Judge Grady considered the interests of ju-
dicial efficiency and decreasing the economic burden on parties litigat-
ing the case as a strong indication of the superiority of the class action
device.
Moreover, other aggregative techniques do not provide equivalent
means to attain efficiency available under Rule 23(b)(3). Multidistrict
litigation falls short of providing the most efficient method to resolve
mass product liability claims. While multidistrict litigation engenders
a certain level of efficiency at the pretrial stage, eventually cases are
remanded to their original jurisdiction for trial. The actual trial pro-
cess is extraordinarily expensive. As a result, multidistrict litigation
does not provide maximum efficiency in processing claims. Moreover,
consolidation of cases does not achieve efficiency comparable to that
352. The defendants objected to the possibility of requiring one jury to apply 50
negligence standards in effect in different states. The defendants only advanced two
differences in state law, however. The first difference is that only some states distin-
guish between ordinary negligence and a professional standard of care. Id. at 418. A
jury can easily distinguish between these two standards, however, and apply the law of
each. The second difference is that some states incorporate the foreseeability of in-
jury into their negligence standards and others do not. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). A jury may
similarly distinguish between these two standards.
353. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
354. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc, Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 425-26 (N.D. Ill.
1994), rev'd sub nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995). The parties will have to relitigate claims already decided
in 12 cases. See, e.g., Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1186 (11th Cir. 1995)
(reviewing an appeal from a jury award of $2 million to an HIV-infected hemophiliac
against Armour Pharmaceutical Company); Jones v. Miles Labs., 887 F.2d 1576, 1577-
78 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding district court's judgment notwithstanding verdict for
defendant manufacturer of AHF, after jury awarded HIV-infected plaintiff $1.6 mil-
lion); McKee v. Cutter Labs., 866 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding district
court's grant of summary judgment to manufacturers of AHF).
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of Rule 23(b)(3). The benefits of consolidation are limited to the
number of cases that are actually consolidated. Unless all cases are
transferred into one jurisdiction, and all cases are consolidated for
trial, judicial resources conserved would not reach the level that would
be attained under a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. An additional alterna-
tive usually available to resolve mass product liability claims is the test
case approach. A major disadvantage of this approach, however, is
the strong potential for defendants to settle with the individual plain-
tiff in the test case. 55 Class members would not benefit if the plaintiff
settles before a jury determines the defendants' liability which would
allow other class members to utilize collateral estoppel with respect to
the liability determination. 56
In Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Grady and Judge Posner disagreed about
an additional issue that factors into the superiority determination,
whether the class would be manageable in light of possible differences
between the state laws that could apply in the case. Judge Posner
voiced legitimate concerns about the possibility that the class would
become unmanageable if applicable state laws conflicted with respect
to the liability of defendants .3 7 Only two such conflicts were identi-
fied by the defendants, however, which could easily be resolved
through certifying subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), to account for
such differences. 58 Moreover, class certification orders are subject to
revocation or modification as circumstances warrant.359 If differences
in state laws were identified that would complicate or prevent efficient
and fair resolution of the issues certified, the judge may revoke or
modify the certification. Thus, class certification at this stage of the
litigation was superior in Rhone-Poulenc because it did not appear
unmanageable.
Judge Posner cited other concerns in refusing to certify the potential
class in Rhone-Poulenc which appear to question the superiority of the
class action device to resolve the liability issue. He stated that a class
action could unfairly subject the defendants to mass liability based
upon one jury's findings and could exert extortionate settlement pres-
sure upon the defendants.36 Judge Posner's analysis, however, ap-
pears to dispense with the requirement that the superiority of the class
action device should be measured against other available methods of
adjudication. Arguably, alternative methods of resolution, including
consolidated or individual trials, could subject the defendants to sub-
stantially equivalent settlement pressure and mass liability. If one jury
355. Newberg & Conte, supra note 43, § 4.27, at 4-111.
356. Id.
357. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300-02.
358. Id. at 1301-02.
359. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1308 (7th Cir.) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 184 (1995).
360. Id. at 1298.
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finds the defendants negligent during the course of an individual trial,
other plaintiffs could translate that one victory into a complete victory
for all plaintiffs through the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel. In
the face of this similar mass liability, defendants may choose to avert
this risk by settling the claims although the allegations against them
may lack merit.
Class certification of common issues in Rhone-Poulenc was superior
to other methods of adjudicating the issues for additional reasons.
Under Rule 23(e), Judge Grady would have had the authority to limit
and control attorneys fees-an opportunity that is not available by
other methods of adjudication.36' Furthermore, class adjudication
would have provided for efficient resolution of common issues while
protecting the interests of class members in advancing their own inter-
ests independently. Questions unique to class members would be ad-
judicated independently because the district court only agreed to
resolve the common issue of the defendants' negligence as part of the
class proceeding. Alternatively class members could have chosen to
opt out of the class and pursued their claims independently. Finally, a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action would have been superior because it would
have levelled the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants.
Plaintiffs would have received the economies of scale inherent in
spreading the cost of litigation across the entire class. Defendants
would have received the opportunity to bind all plaintiffs, except
those who have chosen to opt out of the class, if they win the class
action.
Accordingly, certification under Rules 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4)(A)
was the superior method of adjudicating the claim in Rhone-Poulenc.
A certified class was the most efficient method of adjudication. More-
over, the class action was manageable, especially considering the
power of the court under Rule 23(c)(4)(B) to certify subclasses if vari-
ous state laws conflicted. Judge Posner's additional objections to class
certification do not consider that other available methods to adjudi-
cate the claim fall victim to identical complications. Finally, class reso-
lution provides numerous advantages to parties litigating the claims
that are not available in other methods of adjudication.
F. Advocating the Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions
Critics of class action certification in mass product liability claims
have misplaced concerns of utilizing Rule 23(b)(3) in the context of
mass product liability actions. As has been demonstrated, often when
courts refuse to allow class resolution of mass product liability claims
their objections rely on misperceptions or ignore the reality that
courts are well equipped to deal with any of the cited complications.
Moreover, the affirmative benefits that may be achieved by certifying
361. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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class actions to resolve mass product liability claims outweigh any ob-
jection suggested by courts or commentators. Applying Rule 23(b)(3)
in the mass product liability context provides a greater incentive for
companies to engage in safe and responsible marketing and manufac-
ture of their products. Moreover, the efficiency provided by Rule
23(b)(3), and its reduction of transaction costs, promotes access to the
civil justice system and ensures that the maximum amount of any
award available goes to the plaintiffs.
Thus, in Rule 23(b)(3), Congress provided judges with an effective
means to manage complex cases in a way that promotes fairness and
efficiency. Judges should take full advantage of this discretionary au-
thority to certify classes for the resolution of common issues in mass
product liability cases that meet Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements.
CONCLUSION
Modem companies profit from mass manufacturing and marketing
products to the general public. Some of these products have the po-
tential to harm or kill their consumers. Companies cannot reap all the
profits of operating their businesses on a nationwide basis without ac-
cepting responsibility for the nationwide harm that can result from the
use of a dangerous product. Thus, the tort system should provide an
efficient avenue for victims to attain compensation for their injuries
when companies abdicate their responsibility to exercise due care in
the development and manufacture of their products.
Federal courts may certify class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) to re-
solve these claims efficiently and fairly. Courts have succumbed to
unfounded fears, however, that certifying class actions in this type of
litigation would be problematic. Consequently, courts have forced
parties involved in mass product liability actions to litigate their claims
independently or through less effective aggregative techniques. These
objections to class certification may be overcome, however, by various
means, including partially certifying classes with respect to common
issues and certifying subclasses to account for conflicting applicable
laws. If courts utilize Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve mass product liability
claims or issues in this context, plaintiffs may enjoy the economies of
scale provided by Rule 23(b)(3). Defendants may bind all class mem-
bers, except those who have chosen to opt out, if they win a class
action. Courts may eliminate repetitive litigation that crowds their
dockets. Accordingly, courts should exercise their discretion to certify
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to resolve common issues in mass product
liability claims.
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